The Elusive Concept of Control in Churning Claims under Federal Securities and Commodities Law by O\u27Hara, Patricia A.
Notre Dame Law School 
NDLScholarship 
Journal Articles Publications 
1987 
The Elusive Concept of Control in Churning Claims under Federal 
Securities and Commodities Law 
Patricia A. O'Hara 
Notre Dame Law School, pohara1@nd.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Patricia A. O'Hara, The Elusive Concept of Control in Churning Claims under Federal Securities and 
Commodities Law, 75 Geo. L. J. 1875 (1986-1987). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/875 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please 
contact lawdr@nd.edu. 
The Elusive Concept of Control in Churning
Claims Under Federal Securities and
Commodities Law
PATRICIA A. O'HARA*
Account executives in the trading departments of most brokerage houses
stand in a classic conflict of interest position with respect to their customers.1
On one hand, they frequently hold themselves out as investment counselors,
purporting to offer disinterested advice to their clients regarding the merits of
buying or selling a particular investment. On the other hand, the firm gener-
ates its profits and compensates its sales staff either by charging commissions
on transactions that the firm executes as agent on the customer's behalf or by
selling securities to a customer as principal from the firm's own inventory at
a price above the firm's original cost.2
* Associate Professor of Law, The Law School, University of Notre Dame. B.A. 1971, Univer-
sity of Santa Clara; J.D. 1974, University of Notre Dame. The author wishes to express apprecia-
tion to her colleague, Douglas W. Kmiec, and to Timothy J. Carey of Finley, Kumble, Wagner,
Heine, Underberg, Manley & Casey, New York, New York, for their helpful review of an earlier
draft of this article. The author also wishes to acknowledge the valuable student research assistance
of Anthony A. Bonacci, Mary M. Sullivan, and Jeffrey D. Linton.
1. See 1 S. GOLDBERG, FRAUDULENT BROKER-DEALER PRACTICES § 2.2[a] (1978) (discussing
conflict of interest); Poser, Options Account Fraud: Securities Churning in a New Context, 39 Bus.
LAW. 571, 573-76 (1984) (conflict of interest exists when broker acts as investment advisor and as
salesman generating commissions); Hyman, Churning in Securities: Full Compensation for the In-
vestor, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 1 (1983) (same); Packard, A Test for Churning in Stock Options, 4
CORP. L. REV. 222, 223 (1981) (same); Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARV. L. REV.
869, 870 (1967) (same); Comment, Private Actions for the Broker's "Churning" of a Securities Ac-
count, 40 Mo. L. REV. 281, 281 (1975) (same).
2. When a sales representative of a broker-dealer firm accepts from a customer an order to
purchase or sell a security and executes that order on the customer's behalf with another broker-
dealer, the firm is functioning in its capacity as a broker. 5B A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRAC-
TICE UNDER RULE 101-5 § 210.02, at 9-5 (2d rev. ed. 1986). The relationship between customer
and firm is that of principal and agent. Id. at 9-5 to 9-6 A customer compensates a firm for its
services in executing the order by payment of a commission, which represents a percentage of the
trade price. Firms generally compensate salesmen by paying them a percentage of the commissions
they produce. For an excellent description of the brokerage industry's commission-rate system, see
Poser, supra note I, at 573-76.
A sales representative of a broker-dealer firm may also accept an order from a customer for
purchase or sale of a security and satisfy the order by selling the customer that security from the
firm's own inventory or purchasing the security from the customer for the firm's own account. 5B
A. JACOBS, supra, § 210.02, at 9-5 to -6. In this situation, the firm is functioning as a dealer, and the
relationship between the parties is that of vendor-purchaser rather than principal-agent. Id. When
functioning as a dealer, the firm does not charge a commission. It profits if it subsequently resells a
security in its inventory to a customer at a higher price than it originally paid to obtain the security
for its own account. When the resale results in a profit, the difference between the resale price and
the firm's original cost is referred to as the "spread" or "markup."
In summary, a broker functions as an agent, acting on behalf of the customer. A dealer functions
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Whether functioning as broker or dealer, the brokerage house profits from
as a principal, buying or selling for the firm's own account. The statutory definitions of broker and
dealer in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1982 & Supp. III 1985) reflect
this fundamental distinction. Section 3(a)(4) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1982), states:
"The term 'broker' means any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities
for the account of others, but does not include a bank." In contrast, § 3(a)(5) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1982), provides:
The term "dealer" means any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securi-
ties for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a bank, or
any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own account, either individually or
in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of a regular business.
In the commodities industry the futures commission merchant is the counterpart of the brokerage
house in the securities industry. 1 P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION § 1.33, at 101 (1982).
Section 2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985) defines a "futures commission merchant" to include:
[]ndividuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts engaged in soliciting or
in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery on or
subject to the rules of any contract market and that, in or in connection with such solicita-
tion or acceptance of orders, accepts [sic] any money, securities, or property (or extends
credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result or
may result therefrom.
Futures commission merchants charge their customers commissions for their services. Such
commissions, however, are calculated differently than in the securities industry because of differ-
ences inherent in the commodities trading process. Lowe, Churning in Commodity Futures Ac-
counts, 5 CORP. L. REv. 322, 325-26 (1982).
Commodity futures are standardized contracts for purchase and sale of a quantity of a commod-
ity at a certain price for delivery at some future date. Id. at 322-23. The seller (a "short") agrees to
deliver and the buyer (a "long") agrees to buy a specified quantity and grade of a particular com-
modity for an agreed price at a defined period in the future. 1 P. JOHNSON, supra, § 1.03, at 8. The
bulk of futures contracts, however, are never actually performed. Id. § 1.04, at 9. Instead, they are
extinguished through a second transaction in which the original trader enters the market a second
time to acquire the same type of contract bearing an obligation opposite to his first transaction. The
two transactions offset each other, and the party is thereby excused from actual performance. Id. If
there has been a movement in the market price between the two transactions, the offsetting party
either will be required to pay money or will be entitled to receive money to complete the offset,
depending on the direction of movement in the market price. Id. at 9-10.
Commissions are paid to the futures commission merchant at the time the trader liquidates his
position through offset. Lowe, supra, at 325. The commission may be a percentage of the value of
the contract or a fixed sum. Id. The commodities trader, therefore, owes one commission for two
transactions in contrast to a securities customer who owes a commission on every trade. Id. The
commission may represent a larger percentage of the commodities trader's original investment,
however, because commodity futures contracts may be purchased with a smaller deposit than is
required to purchase securities. Id. at 326.
The distinctions between a broker, a dealer, and a futures commission merchant can assume
substantial importance in a variety of legal contexts. For example, whether a securities firm is
acting as a broker or a dealer may affect the existence of a fiduciary duty to the customer. Brokers,
dealers, and futures commission merchants, however, may all be tempted to induce active trading in
a customer's account for the purpose of generating profits for themselves. Thus, similar to industry
practice, this article uses the word "broker" to refer to brokers, dealers, futures commission
merchants and their sales representatives, unless the context indicates a more precise application.
The article uses the word "commissions" to refer to profits, whether generated in the form of com-
missions or in the form of markups over original cost.
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execution of the transaction, independently of whether the customer profits
on the investment.3 Thus, the industry's compensation system creates an
incentive for a broker to induce active trading in a customer's account. 4 This
self-interest stands at odds with the fiduciary duties normally ascribed to a
broker when functioning as an advisor to a client.5
A broker's temptation to put his own interest ahead of the customer's in-
terest increases if the customer sets up a discretionary account, formally vest-
ing the broker with authority to make trading decisions on the customer's
3. In a graphic metaphor, Stuart Goldberg has described the conflict of interest inherent in the
compensation system of brokerage firms as follows:
Whether it is a purchase of a new stock or a sale of a bond already owned, and regardless
of gain or loss on the transaction, the broker-dealer gets its commission, and the registered
representative gets his or her split. In a very real sense, a brokerage firm when dealing
with a commission transaction, is like a poker casino or a pari-mutuel horse track-the
owners take their cut and just can't lose. What they have in common is that the more
action, the higher the total amount of the cut and the greater the ultimate profits. How-
ever, what these three financial institutions are definitely not supposed to have in common
is the same attitude toward the consumer .... In the last instance of a securities investor,
the broker-dealer is deemed a fiduciary who is charged with the duty of loyalty to its
customers.
1 S. GOLDBERG, supra note 1, § 2.1, at 2-3 (cross-reference omitted).
While Mr. Goldberg's discussion focuses on the commission-rate system in pure brokerage trans-
actions, the same potential for conflict exists in principal transactions in which a securities firm
takes a markup over its original cost.
4. The Fifth Circuit noted in Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb.
1981):
For as long as investment brokers have been remunerated on a commission basis, the
potential has existed for brokers to excessively trade accounts in an effort to generate fees.
Not surprisingly, for almost as long a period of time, civil suits alleging excessive trading
or "churning" in violation of the broker's common law fiduciary duty and the federal
securities law have dotted the federal docket.
Id. at 323 (footnote omitted); see 1 S. GOLDBERG, supra note 1, § 2.2[a], at 2-8 (broker's income
depends on commission generated); Poser, supra note 1, at 573-76 (same).
5. When an investment firm functions as a broker, it acts as an agent on behalf of its customer
and, therefore, owes certain fiduciary duties to the customer under common law principles. 5B A.
JACOBS, supra note 2, § 210.03, at 9-12. The scope of fiduciary duties the broker owes may vary
significantly, however, depending upon whether the customer opens a discretionary account, in
which the broker has authority to conduct trading without consulting the client, or a nondiscretion-
ary account, in which a broker needs client authorization for trades. As might be expected, a
broker owes more extensive duties in the former situation.
In contrast to the fiduciary duties ascribed to the status of a broker, when an investment firm
functions as a dealer, it acts as a principal for its own account. Thus, under common law principles,
the investment firm does not stand in a fiduciary relationship to its customer. N. WOLFSON, R.
PHILLIPS & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 2.03, at
2-15 (1977). The SEC has developed two theories in administrative proceedings, however, which
greatly undercut the common law notion that a dealer as vendor may treat his customer at arm's
length. Id. See infra notes 78-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "shingle theory"
and "fiduciary theory."
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behalf.6 The same incentive may be present, however, even when the ac-
count is technically established as a nondiscretionary account if the broker,
for all practical purposes, is making the trading decisions.7
Churning occurs when a broker violates the fiduciary duties he owes to a
customer in favor of his own remunerative self-interest. 8 If a customer can
establish that a broker controlled the level of activity in the customer's secur-
ities or commodities account, through either a formal grant of discretionary
authority or the functional equivalent thereof, and traded that account exces-
sively in light of the customer's financial resources and investment objectives
to generate greater profits for himself, then the customer may recover dam-
ages for churning under federal securities and commodities laws.9
6. In a discretionary account, a broker may trade without an express authorization from the
customer for each transaction. Hill v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 790 F.2d 817, 820 n.3
(10th Cir. 1986). In a nondiscretionary account, the customer is supposed to authorize each trade.
Id.
The rules of various stock exchanges and of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) require that a grant of discretionary power be in writing. E.g., N.Y.S.E. Rule 408, 2
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2408, at 3701-4 to -5 (1979); N.A.S.D. RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE art. III,
§ 15(b), N.A.S.D. Manual (CCH) 1 2165, at 2078 (1986). The absence of a writing, however, does
not preclude the customer from asserting that the broker exercised a degree of control over a non-
discretionary account equivalent to a grant of discretionary power. Such cases are the central focus
of this article.
7. As Stuart Goldberg notes in his discussion of the control element of a churning case:
[I]n order to prove that churning took place in an investor's account it must first be estab.
lished that the broker-dealer was "vested" with "discretionary power." This power can
arise in several ways: most obvious would be in an account in which an express formal
written discretionary agreement was executed by the investor running in favor of the bro-
ker-dealer or a designated registered representative; less obvious, but of equal legal effect,
is the situation in which the broker-dealer exercises implied de facto ("in fact") control.
Situations involving this latter type, of implied discretionary power, constitute virtually all
of the litigation regarding churning, and create the most difficult issue of proving its
existence.
I S. GOLDBERG, supra note 1, § 2.8, at 2-22 to -23; see Williamsport Firemen Pension Bds. v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 567 F. Supp. 140, 144 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (essential element of churning claim is that
broker has authority to exercise complete discretion over activity in account; however, requisite
degree of control by broker may be present even if account is nondiscretionary); Newburger, Loeb
& Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364, 1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding of control not dependent on
account being formally labeled discretionary but rather on who in fact was making decisions), aff'd,
563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
8. See, e.g., Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1501
(11th Cir. 1985); Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1367 (7th Cir. 1983): Stevens v.
Abbott, Procter & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 845 (E.D. Va. 1968).
9. See, e.g., Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1501
(11 th Cir. 1985); Bowley v. Stotler & Co., 751 F.2d 641, 644 (3d Cir. 1985); Hatrock v. Edward D.
Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 775 (9th Cir. 1984); Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361,
1367 (7th Cir. 1983); Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1416-17
(11th Cir. 1983); Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. Commodities, 688 F.2d 1193, 1203 (8th Cir.
1982); Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer
& Co., 637 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814,
1878
CHURNING CLAIMS
Although much attention has been given to the various tests used to mea-
sure excessive trading in a churning case and to the difficult issue of damages,
there has been little focus on the question of control over the account.10 Es-
tablishing that a broker controlled the level of trading in a customer's ac-
count is the very foundation of a churning suit.11 If a customer opens a
discretionary account, the form of the account itself establishes the requisite
control by the broker. 12 Courts and governing regulatory agencies, however,
have wrestled unsuccessfully with the problem of delineating what consti-
tutes de facto control by a broker in a nondiscretionary securities or com-
modities account. In light of the growing number of churning suits, this
pivotal issue merits further attention.
13
To establish the proper context for examination of this elusive aspect of a
churning suit, this article first reviews the statutory bases for a churning
claim under federal securities and commodities laws and the basic elements
of a private action for churning. It then traces the judicial and administra-
tive evolution of the concept of control in churning claims involving nondis-
cretionary securities and commodities accounts. Next, it analyzes the
problems presented by the existing disparity in standards used to determine
control. Finally, this article proposes a suggested framework for examining
the facts in a churning suit with a view to resolving the control issue. This
article recommends a return to the emphasis on relational reliance, which
dominated the early enforcement decisions of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in churning cases. Focusing on reliance in the context of
the customer's relationship with his broker is analogous to the proof of reli-
ance required of a plaintiff in a normal transactional fraud suit brought
under the same antifraud provisions involved in churning claims.
820-21 (9th Cir. 1980); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Carras v. Burns, 526 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975).
10. For a collection of authorities on the excessive trading element of a churning case, see infra
note 44. For a collection of authorities on the computation of damages in a churning case, see infra
note 64. For previous discussions by commentators of the control element of a churning case, see
infra note 74.
11. Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 432 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Moscarelli v.
Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
12. See, e.g., Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 (7th Cir. 1983); Follansbee v.
Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Siegel Trading Co., [1980-1982
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,105, at 24,454 n.7 (CFTC Sept. 3, 1980); Jenny
v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,568, at 94,381-
82 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1978).
13. Professor Loss has noted that litigation over churning seems to be increasing. L. Loss, FUN-
DAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 151 (Supp. 1986).
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I. THE STATUTORY BASES FOR A CHURNING CLAIM UNDER FEDERAL
SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW
When a customer entrusts control of his account to a broker, the broker
assumes a fiduciary duty to exercise that control in favor of the customer.14
Liability for churning rests upon the breach of fiduciary duty that occurs if
the broker subsequently abuses his control by engaging in a pattern of trad-
ing that advances his self-interest in a manner detrimental to the interests of
the customer.15
In common law terms, churning is more akin to constructive fraud than to
actual fraud.16 For example, in a typical securities fraud case, a plaintiff
complains about some type of active deception on the part of the defendant
that influenced the plaintiff's decision to engage in a particular investment
transaction. The plaintiff alleges that in the course of making a decision to
buy or sell an investment, he relied on certain information supplied by the
defendant that was inaccurate or incomplete. If the defendant acted with the
14. See Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 461 F. Supp. 951, 952-54 (E.D. Mich.
1978) (broker owes only limited transactional duties to customer when pure nondiscretionary ac-
count is involved, in which the customer rather than the broker determines which purchases and
sales to make; in contrast, broker handling discretionary account becomes customer's fiduciary in a
broad sense and owes special duty to act in highest good faith; broker owes customer same fiduciary
duties as in discretionary account if broker usurps control over a technically nondiscretionary ac-
count); Stevens v. Abbott, Procter & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 847 (E.D. Va. 1968) (broker handling
discretionary account has duty to act in highest good faith toward customer); Twomey v. Mitchum,
Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 720, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 243 (1968) (broker who
undertakes to control customer's account owes duty to ascertain customer's financial situation and
manage account accordingly); Pierce v. Richard Ellis & Co., 62 Misc. 2d 771, 772, 310 N.Y.S.2d
266, 268 (Civ. Ct. 1970) (when broker handles discretionary account, he becomes fiduciary for
customer's benefit and undertakes highest obligation of good faith and fair dealing).
15. Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Judge Bartels' opinion cap-
tures the breach of trust at the heart of a churning claim:
Over-trading, per se, in an account whose transactions are initiated by a customer does not
constitute churning in the absence of any fiduciary relationship. But over-trading will
constitute churning whenever a broker or dealer, who is in a position to determine the
volume and frequency of transactions by reason of the confidence imposed in him, abuses
the confidence of the customer for personal gain by frequent and numerous transactions
disproportionate to the investment in the account. Such conduct on the part of the broker
provides an action for breach of trust under common law principles.
Id. at 457 (citations omitted).
16. See Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 171 (10th Cir.
1974) (although gravamen of churning allegation is existence of fraud, this refers to fraud in law;
churning is in nature of constructive fraud in that it is considered a scheme under rule lOb-5 involv-
ing deception of customer and reliance by customer on integrity of broker); Marshak v. Blyth,
Eastman, Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377, 379 (N.D. Okla. 1975) (same); Twomey v. Mitchum,
Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 711-12, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 237-38 (1968) (cus-
tomer's pleadings that included allegations of excessive trading raised issue of breach of fiduciary
relationship constituting constructive fraud; constructive fraud arises on breach of duty by one in
confidential or fiduciary relationship to another that induces justifiable reliance by latter to his
prejudice).
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requisite degree of culpability, the plaintiff recovers damages for actual
fraud-the injury to his informational reliance interest in making a decision
to buy or sell.' 7
In a churning suit, however, the fraud does not arise from an informa-
17. For example, the bulk of suits complaining about fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security are brought under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), and rule lOb-
5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986) promulgated thereunder.
Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 do not expressly provide for a private right of action. A private
right of action was first implied under § 10(b) in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,
514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). By 1969, 10 of the 11 federal circuit courts recognized the existence of an
implied remedy under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. See 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3871-73
(2d ed. Supp. 1969) (collecting cases). The United States Supreme Court confirmed the existence of
an implied cause of action under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 & n.9 (1971). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its recognition of
this private right of action in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) ("The
existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure.").
Unlike the various express causes of action provided under federal securities law, the elements of
an implied claim under § 10(b) and rule lob-5 do not all arise from the face of the statute or the text
of the rule. They are in large part a product of judicial development and thus have changed over
time.
Volumes have been written on the elements, defenses, and measure of damages applicable to an
implied action under rule l0b-5. See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1448-74, 1763-
97 (2d ed. 1961); 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES
FRAUD §§ 8.1-.9 (1982); 4id. §§ 9.1-.3, 11.2, 11.5 (1982); 5 A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE
UNDER RULE 1OB-5 §§ 36-40.09 (1985).
The requirements most frequently mentioned for proof of an implied claim under rule lob-5 in a
transactional fraud setting include the following:
(1) Plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of a security. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733-34 (1975) (discussing Congress' provision of express remedies for
nonpurchasers elsewhere in legislative scheme and difficulty of determining actual damages). While
some early decisions limited the scope of defendant parties' liability by a privity requirement, privity
is no longer required. See 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra, § 8.5 (discussing dissolution
of privity requirement for rule lOb-5 actions). Primary liability extends to violative conduct by
"any person." A plaintiff can also sue persons whose involvement in the violative conduct is only
secondary, under principles of aiding and abetting or conspiracy. See generally Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Par! Delicto, Indem-
nification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972) (distinguishing primary and secondary
liability and discussing elements of aiding and abetting and conspiracy claim). But see Fischel,
Secondary Liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 80 (1981)
(rejecting viability of secondary liability theories in light of recent Supreme Court decisions strictly
interpreting federal securities laws); Comment, Rule lob-5 Liability after Hochfelder: Abandoning
the Concept of Aiding and Abetting, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 218 (1977) (rejecting aiding and abetting
concept in favor of narrower "substantial factor" test).
(2) Plaintiff must establish a violation of one of the three prohibitory subsections of the rule. See
infra note 27 (setting forth text of rule lOb-5). In a transactional setting this typically takes the
form of an allegation that the defendant misstated or omitted a material fact. If a plaintiff alleges an
omission, silence on the part of the defendant is actionable only if the defendant was under a duty to
disclose. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-59 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
225-30 (1980) (liability premised on duty to disclose arising from fiduciary relationship). Material-
ity of the misstated or omitted information is tested according to whether or not there is a substan-
tial likelihood that a reasonable investor or shareholder would consider the information important
in deciding to purchase or sell. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)
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tional deception surrounding a particular investment decision; instead a con-
structive fraud arises from frustration of the customer's expectation that if he
delegates authority to a broker to make investment decisions for him, the
broker will act in the customer's best interest and not his own. Churning
thus involves injury to the customer's relational reliance interest-that is,
exploitation by a broker of the confidence placed in him by a customer in the
context of their ongoing relationship.1 8
Grounded in the law of fiduciary responsibility and constructive fraud,
("An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote.").
(3) Plaintiff must establish use of interstate commerce, the mails, or a facility of a national securi-
ties exchange in some part of the transaction.
(4) Plaintiff must establish that the violation of the substantive prohibition of rule lOb-5 was "in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security." See infra note 27 (setting forth text of rule lob-
5). The language "in connection with" reached its broadest scope during the era of expansive inter-
pretation of rule lOb-5 in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11-13
(1971).
(5) Plaintiff must establish reliance. See 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENEELS, supra, § 8.6(1) (dis-
cussing element of reliance in rule lob-5 actions). This requirement is relaxed in cases involving
omissions by a presumption in favor of reliance upon proof of materiality and a duty to disclose.
See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (obligation to disclose and
withholding of material fact establish requisite element of causation in fact; positive proof of reli-
ance is not prerequisite to recovery). Some courts have also relaxed the reliance requirement by
allowing plaintiff to establish reliance on the integrity of the market, as opposed to reliance on
disputed information. See Shores v. Sklar, 610 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 647
F.2d 462, 468-70 (5th Cir. May 1981) (en bane) (even though plaintiff did not rely on offering
circular, he could successfully state claim under rule lob-5 based on allegations that security
purchased was brought into market fraudulently and he relied on integrity of offerings in market)
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1981); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981) (reliance on
information from those working in or reporting on securities market, where information is circu-
lated after material misrepresentation or omission, is sufficient to support lob-5 cause of action),
cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975) (proof of
reliance on particular misrepresentations unnecessary to establish rule lob-5 claim; proof of
purchase and of materiality of misrepresentations is sufficient), cert denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
See generally Rapp, Rule 10b-5 and "Traud-on-the-Market'-Heavy Seas Meet Tranquil Shores, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 861 (1982); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARv. L. REV.
1143 (1982).
(6) Plaintiff must establish scienter on the part of the defendant. A showing of negligence is
insufficient. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (no private cause of action will lie
without allegation of scienter). The Supreme Court left open the question of whether or not reck-
less conduct may subject a defendant to liability in this context. Id. at 193 n.12. In the wake of
Hochfelder, numerous courts have held that reckless behavior is sufficient for liability. 3B H.S.
BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 9.22[4][fl, at 9-155 (1986).
18. For a general discussion comparing active fraud in a transactional setting and constructive
fraud in a fiduciary relationship, see Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by Securities Professionals, 61
TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1249-58 (1983). In this article, Professor Langevoort explores whether churn-
ing and similar misconduct by brokers can withstand analysis under rule lob-5 in the wake of the
Supreme Court decision in Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Santa Fe, the
Court approved a trial court's dismissal of a complaint filed by minority shareholders of a corpora-
tion who sought to challenge under § 10(b) and rule lob-5 the fairness of a Delaware short-form
merger engineered by the majority shareholder to eliminate the minority interest. Id. at 468-71.
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The Court held that a complaint involving a mere breach of fiduciary duty is not actionable under
§ 10(b) and rule lOb-5, absent allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, or deception. Id. at 471-74.
After Santa Fe, shareholder complaints alleging mismanagement or self-dealing by corporate fi-
duciaries face a difficult path if framed under rule 10b-5. Under a strict reading of the holding in
Santa Fe, they should not be cognizable under § 10(b). Innovative appellate courts, however, have
carved inroads into the Santa Fe doctrine by upholding such complaints if they allege nondisclosure
of material information that if revealed would have permitted a shareholder an opportunity to rem-
edy the abuse. Langevoort, supra, at 1274 & nn.105-07.
In marked contrast to the controversy surrounding corporate mismanagement cases, churning
actions under rule 10b-5 have remained virtually unaffected by Santa Fe, even though churning
claims also turn on a breach of fiduciary duty. Lower courts simply proceed on the assumption that
churning involves deception and is proscribed by rule lOb-5. Id. at 1247. Professor Langevoort
concludes that the difference in treatment between breach of fiduciary duty cases involving corpo-
rate mismanagement under rule lOb-5 and those involving churning is justified, but not for the
reasons articulated in the opinions. Id. at 1271-83.
Professor Langevoort theorizes that the Supreme Court's attempt in Santa Fe to set up a dichot-
omy between a breach of fiduciary duty and fraud is essentially untenable. Id. at 1248. Tracing the
development of the concepts of fiduciary duty and fraud through common law, the federal mail
fraud and wire fraud statutes, and the federal securities laws, he argues that every secret breach of
fiduciary duty is inherently deceptive. At a minimum, it deprives the principal of facts necessary to
protect his own interest in deciding whether to retain or terminate the fiduciary. Id. at 1257-58. To
the extent that every secret breach of fiduciary duty involves deception, Santa Fe's distinction be-
tween fiduciary duty and fraud becomes illusory. Id. at 1277. Thus, Professor Langevoort argues it
is necessary to move to a second level of inquiry and determine whether the interest of the person
defrauded is within the zone of interests sought to be protected under rule lOb-5. Id.
Pointing to the requirement in rule lob-5 that the deception at issue be "in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security," he reasons that only breaches of fiduciary duty that affect the invest-
ment decision process and impair the transaction-encouraging purpose of the rule fall within its
coverage. Id. He concludes that mismanagement breaches are generally too far removed from the
shareholders' investment decision to fall within the protection of rule lOb-5, but breaches by securi-
ties professionals that affect the integrity of the investment process are within the zone of interests
protected by the rule. Id. at 1294-95. Professor Langevoort offers this analysis as a sounder theo-
retical justification for the difference in treatment between these two categories of cases.
In developing his thesis that the distinction between a breach of fiduciary duty and fraud is
largely illusory, Professor Langevoort begins by comparing and contrasting active fraud in a trans-
actional setting with constructive fraud in a fiduciary setting. Id. at 1249-52. He notes that the law
of fraud supports the concept of a "transactional reliance interest" in that it defines the circum-
stances under which one person may rely on another to supply him with information needed to
make a decision. The law of fraud protects against cheating in the contract formation process, thus
reducing the transactional costs that would attend independent discovery efforts by the deci-
sionmaker. Id. at 1251-52.
In contrast, the law of fiduciary responsibility promotes what Professor Langevoort describes as a
"relational reliance interest." It defines the circumstances under which a person may delegate dis-
cretion to a fiduciary with confidence that the fiduciary will act loyally with regard to his interests.
The law of fiduciary duty protects against cheating by the fiduciary after the relationship is estab-
lished, thus reducing the transactional costs which would attend constant oversight by the principal
or a specialized contract anticipating opportunistic behavior by the fiduciary. Id. at 1249-50.
Professor Langevoort argues that the two doctrines are quite similar conceptually, although they
differ in focus. Id. at 1252, 1257. Transactional fraud involves an active decisionmaker who relied
on inaccurate or incomplete information. Constructive fraud usually involves a passive principal
who delegated decisionmaking authority to a faithless agent. In both circumstances, however, the
injured party is misinformed to his detriment because even the passive principal must implicitly
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:1875
churning may be remedied by an action brought at common law. 19 Shortly
after its formation, the SEC also acted to prohibit churning. Section 15(c)(1)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits broker-dealers from using
any fraudulent or manipulative device to effectuate transactions in the over-
the-counter market.20 Pursuant to rulemaking authority granted in this sec-
tion, the SEC promulgated rule 15cl-7,21 which defines the term "manipula-
tive, deceptive or other fraudulent device or contrivance," as used in section
15(c)(1), to include "transactions or [sic] purchase or sale which are exces-
sive in size or frequency in view of the financial resources and character" of
an account in which a broker-dealer has been vested with discretionary
authority. 22
Rule 15cl-7 applies only to churning of a discretionary account in transac-
tions effected through the over-the-counter market.23 The SEC has always
maintained, however, that the rule represents only one instance in which
churning is illegal under federal securities law.24 Thus, in early disciplinary
decide whether to continue to extend discretion to his fiduciary-a decision that should theoreti-
cally be fully informed. Id. at 1257.
Thus, Professor Langevoort concludes that both doctrines serve to preclude the appropriation of
value arising out of an exchange relationship to which one party would not have consented if fully
informed. Id. at 1252. Viewed from this perspective, protecting the relational reliance interest at
stake in a churning suit serves much the same transaction-encouraging objective as does the bar-
gain-oriented duty of full disclosure in the transactional fraud setting. Id. at 1257, 1279-83.
19. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 326 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981); Moscarelli v.
Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc.,
262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 704-06, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 233-34 (1968).
20. Section 15(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1982 & Supp.
III 1985) provides in pertinent part:
No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase
or sale of, any security... otherwise than on a national securities exchange of which it is a
member by means of any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contri-
vance.... The Commission shall, for the purposes of this paragraph, by rules and regula-
tions define such devices or contrivances as are manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise
fraudulent.
21. Rule 15ci-7 provides:
(a) The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance," as
used in section 15(c) of the Act, is hereby defined to include any act of any broker, dealer
or municipal securities dealer designed to effect with or for any customer's account in
respect to which such broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer or his agent or em-
ployee is vested with any discretionary power any transactions or [sic] purchase or sale
which are excessive in size or frequency in view of the financial resources and character of
such account.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7(a) (1986).
22. Id.
23. See rule 15cl-7 (rule limited to discretionary accounts); § 15(c)(1) of the 1934 Act (source of
authority for rule 15cl-7; limitation of rule to transactions other than on national securities
exchange).
24. See In re Grubbs, 28 S.E.C. 323, 328 n.10 (1948) (SEC considers churning violative of rule
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proceedings against broker-dealers, the SEC firmly stated that whether a dis-
cretionary or a nondiscretionary account is involved, churning violates the
general prohibition in section 15(c)(1) against fraudulent broker-dealer prac-
tices in the over-the-counter market, as well as the broader antifraud provi-
sions in section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,25 section 10(b) of the
1934 Act,26 and rule lOb-5 27 promulgated pursuant thereto.28  Indeed, pri-
15cl-2 of 1934 Act, as well as of § 17(a) of 1933 Act); In re Behel, Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163,
168 n.8 (1947) (same); In re Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 890 & n.31 (1946) (same),
aff'd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); In re E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 380 n.48 (1945)
(same).
25. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by
the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
26. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
27. Rule lOb-5, promulgated under § 10(b), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
28. See supra note 24. Unlike § 15(c)(1) of the 1934 Act, the general antifraud provisions in
§ 17(a) of the 1933 Act, § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and rule lOb-5 are not limited to fraudulent
practices committed by broker-dealers in the over-the-counter market. These provisions reach
fraud by any person. Assuming the requisite jurisdictional nexus can be established, they apply to
fraud in any market, whether the securities are traded on a national securities exchange, in the over-
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vate suits filed by dissatisfied customers under theories of implied civil liabil-
ity arising from these broader antifraud provisions form the bulk of
decisional precedent in this area.29
the-counter securities market, or in a private transaction. See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION 809-10 (5th ed. 1982).
29. See, for example, the cases collected supra note 9 and infra note 39.
In contrast to various express causes of action provided to investors under the federal securities
laws, such as those found in §§ 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(k)-(l) (1982), neither
§ 17(a) of the 1933 Act nor § 10(b) of the 1934 Act provides on its face for a private right of action.
A private right of action was first implied under § 10(b) in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Relying upon general principles of tort law, in particular the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1939), the court reasoned that a person injured by violation of a
statute designed for his benefit is entitled to a remedy. Id. at 513-14. The Supreme Court has
expressly recognized the existence of an implied cause of action under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. See
supra note 17 (discussing Supreme Court's recognition of private right of action under § 10(b) and
rule lOb-5). The existence of an implied private cause of action under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act,
however, remains an open question.
Section 17(a), the general antifraud provision of the 1933 Act, is roughly analogous to rule lOb-5
of the 1934 Act except that § 17(a) applies to fraud in the offer or sale of a security and does not
extend to fraud by the purchaser of a security. Compare the text of § 17(a), set forth supra note 25,
with the text of rule 10b-5, set forth supra note 27. Part of the reason for promulgation of rule lOb-
5, which applies to fraud in the purchase or sale of a security, was the one-sided nature of § 17(a).
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 28, at 808.
Prior to 1971 most lower federal courts used reasoning analogous to rule lOb-5 cases to recognize
the existence of an implied private cause of action under § 17(a). Id. at 817. At that time, recogniz-
ing a remedy under § 17(a) added little to what was already available under rule lOb-5. T. HAZEN,
THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 13.13, at 509 (1985). Recently, however, a number of
courts have ruled against a private right of action under § 17(a). Id. at 507.
This change may be attributable in part to the Supreme Court's recent reluctance toward imply-
ing a private right of action from a federal statute. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (no implied private cause of action for damages under § 206 of Invest-
ment Advisors Act of 1940; limited implied private cause of action to void an investment adviser's
contract under § 215 of Act); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied
private cause of action under § 17(a) of the 1934 Act). But cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (implied private right of action recognized under Com-
modity Exchange Act). See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 28, at 817-18 (summarizing
arguments against implied private right of action under § 17(a)); T. HAZEN, supra, at 509-11 (sug-
gesting that courts are unlikely to find implied private right of action under § 17(a) in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions).
The shift against implying a private cause of action may also be an attempt to avoid interpretative
problems that now surround recognition of a cause of action under § 17(a). Because recent
Supreme Court decisions have restricted the scope of the remedy afforded under rule lOb-5, § 17(a)
may now offer relief beyond that available under the rule. For example, in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680, 695-701 (1980), the Supreme Court held that the SEC must establish scienter as an element of
a civil enforcement action to enjoin violation of § 10(b), rule lOb-5, or § 17(a)(1). The Court ruled,
however, that the SEC need not establish scienter to enjoin a violation of §§ 17(a)(2) or (3) because
of differences in language in the latter two subsections. In reaching this conclusion, the Court fo-
cused on the wording of the statute rather than on the nature of the relief sought. It seems likely,
therefore, that negligence would support a private cause of action under §§ 17(a)(2) and (3). T.
HAZEN, supra, at 510. If that is the case, it creates the anomalous situation of requiring a defrauded
seller to prove scienter in order to recover under rule lOb-5, while allowing a defrauded buyer to
circumvent the scienter requirement in rule lob-5 by suing under §§ 17(a)(2) or (3). R. JENNINGS
1886
1987] CHURNING CLAIMS 1887
In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,30 the Supreme Court held that a
mere breach of fiduciary duty is not actionable under section 10(b) without
the presence of fraud, misrepresentation, or deception. 31 Although the heart
of a churning claim remains the breach of fiduciary duty committed by the
broker against his customer, federal courts continue to recognize churning as
actionable under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 by characterizing the conduct
as also involving the required element of deception.3 2
By borrowing heavily from securities law precedent, churning of a com-
modities account has been held to violate section 4b,33 the general antifraud
& H. MARSH, supra note 28, at 818. Refusing to recognize a private cause of action under § 17(a) is
one way to avoid such inconsistencies in the overall statutory scheme. Id.
30. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
31. Id. at 470-74.
32. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Catanella & E.F. Hutton & Co.
See. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1405-07 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F.
Supp. 88, 91-92 (E.D. Pa. 1983). See generally Langevoort, supra note 18 (discussing effect of Santa
Fe on churning cases and other instances of broker-dealer misconduct).
In addition to violating statutory antifraud provisions, such as § 10(b) and rule lOb-5, churning
of a securities account is also prohibited under § 15(a) of article III of the N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair
Practice. N.A.S.D. Manual (CCH) % 2165, at 2078 (1986) (prohibits churning by a member of a
discretionary account). The New York Stock Exchange had a comparable rule at one time, but it
was deleted in 1968. N.Y.S.E. Rule 435, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1 2435, at 3775 (1978). In the
wake of recent Supreme Court decisions restricting implication of private causes of action, the
weight of authority is against implication of a private cause of action for violation of the rules of a
self-regulatory organization. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 28, at 863.
The Federal Securities Code proposed by the American Law Institute would also specifically
prohibit churning. 2 FED. SEC. CODE § 1606 (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
Finally, churning may be actionable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), and under various state consumer
protection statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices. Applicability of state consumer pro-
tection statutes depends largely on the language of the particular statute. See Evanston Bank v.
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1014, 1024-26, 1029-30 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (upholding
sufficiency of claim for churning commodities account under RICO and under the Illinois state
statute for deceptive business practices); cf In re Catanella & E.F. Hutton & Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F.
Supp. 1388, 1422-37, 1441-44 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (upholding sufficiency of claim for churning of secur-
ities account under RICO but dismissing count under New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act because
securities fall outside scope of Act). The applicability of RICO and state consumer protection
statutes to churning claims is beyond the scope of this article.
33. Section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful (1) for any member of a contract market, or for any correspondent,
agent, or employee of any member, in or in connection with any order to make, or the
making of, any contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, made, or to be
made, on or subject to the rules of any contract market, for or on behalf of any other
person, or (2) for any person, in or in connection with any order to make, or the making
of, any contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery made, or to be made, on or
subject to the rules of any contract market, for or on behalf of any other person if such
contract for future delivery is or may be used for (a) hedging any transaction in interstate
commerce in such commodity or the products or byproducts thereof, or (b) determining
the price basis of any transaction in interstate commerce in such commodity, or (c) deliv-
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provision in the Commodity Exchange Act.34 Such a violation may be sub-
ject to a disciplinary proceeding brought by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) under section 6b of the Act,35 a reparations proceeding
ering any such commodity sold, shipped, or received in interstate commerce for the fulfill-
ment thereof-
(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other person;
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false report or
statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for such person any false
record thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any means whatso-
ever in regard to any such order or contract or the disposition or execution of any such
order or contract, or in regard to any act of agency performed with respect to such order
or contract for such person; or
(D) to bucket such order, or to fill such order by offset against the order or orders of
any other person, or willfully and knowingly and without the prior consent of such person
to become the buyer in respect to any selling order of such person, or become the seller in
respect to any buying order of such person.
7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982).
34. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For early decisions recognizing churning of a
commodities account as a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act, see Booth v. Peavey Co.
Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 133 (8th Cir. 1970) (section 6b of Commodity Exchange Act
permits private remedy for commodity account churning); Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (churning constitutes fraud under § 4b of
Commodity Exchange Act); Smith v. Siegel Trading Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,105, at 24,453 (CFTC Sept. 3, 1980) (same).
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) proposed a customer protection rule in
1977 that would have expressly prohibited churning. Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trad-
ing Professionals, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742, 44,746 (1977) (proposed Sept. 6, 1977). The Commission
decided not to adopt the proposed rule, however, reasoning that the rule would merely codify a
prohibition already implicit in the antifraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act and might
inadvertently narrow the coverage of these provisions in some manner. 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, 31,889
(1978).
Some courts hold that a discretionary commodities account may be treated as an investment
contract within the definition of security in § 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1982), and
§ 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982). See generally 1 A. BROMBERG & L.
LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 4.6. These courts may find that
churning of a discretionary commodities account also states an actionable claim under the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws. See Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523, 525-26 (5th Cir.
1978) (discretionary commodity futures accounts may be "investment contracts" subject to federal
securities laws); Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764, 765-66
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (churning of discretionary commodities accounts states actionable claim under
§ 10(b)). But see Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l Ltd., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 92,858, at 94,184-86 (5th Cir. July 25, 1986) (en banc) (1974 amendments to
Commodity Exchange Act preempt application of § 10(b) to actions involving individual discretion-
ary commodity accounts).
In addition, when a case involves churning of both a securities and a commodities account, some
courts have held that a plaintiff may recover for churning of the commodities account under federal
securities law if the transactions are part of a single fraudulent scheme. See Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff may recover for entire loss under
§ 10(b) and rule lOb-5 when single fraudulent scheme involves churning of both securities and
commodities accounts).
35. Commodity Exchange Act § 6b, 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1982). See generally 2 P. JOHNSON, COMMOD-
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brought by a customer before the CFTC under section 14 of the Act, 36 or a
private action for damages brought by a customer in federal district court.
37
Churning in the commodities context has also been held to involve inherent
deception and thus has survived challenge under Sante Fe.
38
II. THE CONTOURS OF A PRIVATE ACTION FOR CHURNING UNDER
FEDERAL SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW
To prevail on a churning claim under federal securities or commodities
law, a customer must establish (1) that the broker controlled the level of
trading in the account, (2) that the broker traded the account excessively to
generate commissions for himself, and (3) that the broker engaged in this
activity with the requisite state of mind.39 A broker can be expected to assert
a variety of affirmative defenses, all of which turn on the customer's failure to
complain in a timely fashion about the trading.4° Courts are divided as to
the proper measure of damages in a churning case.4 1
A. CONTROL BY THE BROKER
Active trading in a securites or commodities account will not support a
claim of churning if the trading is directed by the customer.42 Therefore, a
ITIES REGULATION § 4.103 (1982) (description of enforcement remedies available to CFTC for
violation of Commodity Exchange Act).
36. Commodity Exchange Act § 14, 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). Section 14 creates a reparations pro-
gram administered by the CFTC that allows any person to seek relief against a registrant for injury
caused by a violation of the Act or the regulations issued thereunder. See generally 2 P. JOHNSON,
supra note 35, § 4.145-.149.
37. The Supreme Court, in one of its few recent opinions recognizing an implied cause of action
under a federal statute, affirmed the existence of an implied antifraud remedy under the Commodity
Exchange Act. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 356 (1982).
The Court rejected arguments that the administrative reparations program under § 14 of the Act
supplanted rather than supplemented the implied judicial remedy. Id. at 384-85. An express pri-
vate right of action was also created by § 22 of the Commodity Futures Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 25 (1982), enacted by Congress in the Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 235, 96
Stat. 2294, 2322.
38. Roche v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 603 F. Supp. 1411, 1414-15 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (churning inher-
ently involves deception and is more than mere breach of fiduciary duty). See generally Langevoort,
supra note 18 (discussion of effect of Santa Fe on churning cases and other instances of broker-
dealer misconduct).
39. See, e.g., Shad v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 799 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1986); M & B
Contracting Corp. v. Dale, 795 F.2d 531, 533 (6th Cir. 1986); Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1501 (11th Cir. 1985); Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co.,
750 F.2d 767, 775 (9th Cir. 1984); Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 2 (Ist Cir.
1983); Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1416-17 (11th Cir. 1983);
Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981); Mihara v. Dean
Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980).
40. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
42. See Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1048 (7th Cir. 1974) (if salesman conforms to
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customer in a churning case must first establish that the broker controlled
the account. 43 Proof that a customer opened an account as a discretionary
account--one in which the customer gives the broker the authority to con-
duct trading in the account without prior consultation with the customer-
establishes the necessary showing of broker control. By contrast, in a nondis-
cretionary account-one in which the broker is not authorized to execute a
trade without obtaining the prior consent of the customer-the customer
purports to retain control over the account. A customer who opens a nondis-
cretionary account, however, may attempt to show that the broker exercised
de facto control over the account. Defining what constitutes "control" in
this circumstance has become a veritable nightmare for the courts and is the
central focus of this article.
B. EXCESSIVE TRADING
Churning involves excessive trading of a customer's account by a broker to
generate commissions for himself without regard to the customer's best inter-
ests. 44 In one sense, excessiveness is a subjective determination. 45 A volume
customer's objectives, and fulfills fiduciary duty to furnish advice, additional motive of earning
commissions does not convert transaction into violation of § 10(b) of 1934 Act); Leib v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 956-57 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (pattern of trad-
ing, even if excessive, was customer's sole responsibility because customer controlled account);
Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 528, 534 (D. Md. 1978)
("[i]n the absence of a fiduciary relationship excessive trading in an account in which the transac-
tions are initiated by the customer is insufficient for direct liability under section 10(b) since the
element of control is lacking"); accord Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 432
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); In re E.H. Rollins &
Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 380 (1945).
43. See Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1978) ("[c]ontrol of trading is an essential
element of churning"); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1069-70 (2d Cir. 1977)
(customer must show dealer exercised control over trading and manipulated account to his benefit),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); M & B Contracting Corp. v. Dale, 601 F. Supp. 1106, 1111
(E.D. Mich. 1984) (plaintiff failed to establish first essential element of churning-control), aff'd,
795 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1986); Williamsport Firemen Pension Bds. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 567 F.
Supp. 140, 144 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (essential element of churning is that broker had authority to
exercise complete discretion over activity in account); Altschul v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc., 518 F. Supp. 591, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (control is essential element of churning case); Green-
feld v. D.H. Blair & Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,239, at 98,254
(S.D.N.Y. July 18, 1975) (finding of control critical before liability may be premised on churning);
Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 432 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (control essential to
finding of churning).
44. For a general discussion of the excessive trading element of a churning case, see 1 S.
GOLDBERG, supra note 1, § 2.9; 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 212, at 9-123 to -129; N. WOLFSON,
R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, supra note 5, 2.11, at 2-59; Lowe, supra note 2, at 332-43 (excessive
trading of commodities accounts); Packard, supra note 1, at 232-44 (excessive trading of stock op-
tions); Comment, The Lack of a Definite Standard to Measure Excessive Trading Activity in Over-
the-Counter Customers' Securities Accounts, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 116 (1967).
45. See Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodities Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir. 1970) (whether
trading is excessive is question of fact that cannot be determined by any precise rule or formula).
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and frequency of trading that might be acceptable for the account of a
wealthy investor or an investor interested in short-term profits might be to-
tally unacceptable for an investor of modest means who is interested in cur-
rent income and conservation of capital.46 Thus, excessiveness must be
measured according to the customer's financial resources and investment
objectives.47
Although a finding of excessive trading ultimately hinges on subjective
considerations, a variety of objective tests aid courts in determining whether
an account has been overtraded.48 The most important test in securities cases
is turnover ratio, i.e., the number of times within a specified period that a
customer's account has been liquidated and reinvested.4 9 The turnover ratio
is computed by dividing the cost of securities purchased for the account by
the average net equity in the account during the period under considera-
tion.50 Because determination of an excessive turnover rate depends on the
nature of the account and the circumstances of the investor, it is impossible
to state definitively how many times an account must be turned over during a
given period before trading will be deemed excessive.51
46. Compare Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1982) (frequent
trading not excessive when plaintiff was trader looking for profits on short-term swing transactions)
with In re Samuel B. Franklin & Co., 42 S.E.C. 325, 327-29 (1964) (trading found excessive in
accounts of two widows, in view of financial resources and character of accounts). See Costello v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 (7th Cir. 1983) (when customer's goals are aggressive or
speculative, rather than conservative, easier to determine trading not excessive).
47. See Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 (7th Cir. 1983) (customer's invest-
ment goals form standards by which allegations of excessiveness are measured); Mihara v. Dean
Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1980) (question of excessive trading examined in light
of customer's investment objectives); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975) (structure
and investment objectives of account considered to determine whether trading excessive); Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (trading excessive when volume and
frequency of transactions, considered in light of nature of account and customer's situation, needs,
and objectives, was so excessive as to indicate broker's purpose was to derive profit for himself while
disregarding client's interests), modified in part and aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
48. See Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir. 1970) (SEC and
courts often look to objective criteria of turnover ratio, nature of trading, and dealer's profits to
determine excessiveness).
49. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 255 n.2 (4th Cir. 1975) ("turnover" is measure of volume of
trading that changes holdings of portfolio without changing its size).
50. Id.; see, ag., Marshak v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377, 380 (N.D. Okla.
1975); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 842 (E.D. Va. 1968); In re Looper &
Co., 38 S.E.C. 294, 297 n.6 (1958).
51. See Note, supra note 1, at 876 (concluding from review of turnover statistics in SEC enforce-
ment cases that complete turnover once every two months (annual turnover rate of six) likely to be
found excessive). This conclusion has been cited favorably by several courts. See, e.g., Mihara v.
Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 424 F.
Supp. 1021, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part and remanded, 570 F.2d 38 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 401 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2nd Cir. 1977).
Excessiveness, however, must ultimately be measured against the nature of the account and the
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In addition to examining turnover ratio, courts often cite other mathemati-
cal criteria as helpful in establishing excessive trading in a securities account.
Because churning involves overtrading an account to generate commissions,
decisions frequently compare the commissions earned on an account to the
equity in the account, or to the total commission revenue of the individual
broker or the branch of the brokerage firm involved.52
Finally, the presence of certain patterns of trading may lend additional
objective support to a finding of excessive trading in a securities account.
Most of these practices involve frequent changes in the character or identity
of securities in a customer's account with little or no price fluctuation be-
tween transactions. Trades of this nature are frequently difficult to explain in
any terms other than the broker's desire to generate commissions. Churning
decisions, therefore, frequently point to evidence of in-and-out trading, cross-
investment objectives of the customer. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (listing cases af-
firming importance of investor's objectives). For example, in Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563
F.2d 1057, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978), the Second Circuit affirmed a
finding that a customer's account had not been churned, notwithstanding the fact that the turnover
rate averaged seven times a year. The court noted that while turnover ratio and amount of commis-
sions are useful indicators, they must be examined in light of the character of the account. Since the
plaintiff was interested in speculation, a greater amount of activity was to be expected. Id. Con-
versely, even a relatively low turnover rate does not per se insulate the broker. See Jenny v. Shear-
son, Hamill & Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 96,568, at 94,382 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 6, 1978) (refusing to hold as matter of law that turnover rate of 1.84 could never amount to
excessive trading; fuller development of nature of plaintiff's account and trading objectives re-
quired); see also Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1980) (turnover of
account 14 times in 30 months for annualized rate of 5.59 was excessive); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman,
Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (annual turnover rate of 1.85 not excessive),
aff'd in part and remanded, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Marshak v.
Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377, 380 (N.D. Okla. 1975) (turnover rate of 1.226 over
duration of account not clearly excessive); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836,
842 (E.D. Va. 1968) (turnover rate of two or more times per year clearly excessive when broker
should have treated account as investment account for unsophisticated plaintiff); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (turnover ratio between eight and 11.5 in
period of six years and 10 months excessive), modified in part and aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
1970).
52. See, e.g., Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 212 (D. Mass. 1978)
(comparing commissions earned on account to equity in account); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor &
Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 840 (E.D. Va. 1968) (comparing commissions earned on account to indi-
vidual broker's total commission revenue); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 436
(N.D. Cal. 1968) (comparing commissions earned on account to total income of branch, as well as
to individual broker's total commissions), modified in part and aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
One commentator has suggested that a more relevant use of commission statistics would be to
compute the amount of return a customer would have to earn on his average net equity to pay
commissions and other costs associated with trading. I S. GOLDBERG, supra note 1, § 2.9[b][5], at
2-60. CFTC decisions have sometimes used a similar test. See In re Lincolnwood Commodities,
Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) f 21,986, at 28,248-49 (CFTC Jan.
31, 1984) (annualized commission-to-equity ratio adopted as useful factor in determining whether
account has been churned; ratio designed to test whether commissions were incurred at such a rate
that extremely high trading profits were necessary to break even).
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trading, or switching of securities between customers as evidence of excessive
trading.53
Although analysis of the control element of a plaintiff's claim has been
virtually identical in securities and commodities cases, commodities decisions
draw some distinctions with respect to findings of excessive trading. 54 Com-
modity futures contracts inherently involve a heavy turnover.55 Noting the
differences between the securities and commodities markets, commodities de-
cisions borrow only some of the objective indices developed in securities
cases and frequently require greater numerical showings for those indices
they do use.56 If a commodities customer makes a prima facie showing of
53. In-and-out trading refers to a pattern of purchases followed by quick resales and immediate
reinvestment in other securities. Several cases cite evidence of in-and-out trading as indicative of
churning. See, eg., Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975); Kravitz v. Pressman, Froh-
lich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 212 (D. Mass. 1978); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288
F. Supp. 836, 842 (E.D. Va. 1968).
Cross-trading refers to multiple trading of the same securities-i.e., buying, selling, and repur-
chasing one or a small number of securities. Examples of cross-trading may be found in In re R.H.
Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467, 470-71, 474, 479-80 (1955), aff'd per curiam, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956); In re Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 891-94
(1946), aff'd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
Switching securities between customers refers to the practice of recommending that one customer
sell a certain security, while simultaneously recommending that another customer buy that same
security. E.g., In re J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88, 92, 99 (1962), aff'dpercuriam sub nom. Hersh v.
SEC, 325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937 (1964).
54. See Griswold v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 622 F. Supp. 1397, 1407 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (although
principles governing proof of churning claim are same for securities and commodities fraud,
amount of trading deemed excessive in securities account may not be excessive in commodities
account because of highly volatile and trading-oriented nature of commodities market).
55. There are at least three differences between securities and commodities trading that may
affect a determination of excessiveness. First, commodity futures are by definition a short-term
investment with a specified delivery date, generally not too removed in time. The trader must either
close his position prior to the delivery date or perform the contract. Thus, the nature of a commod-
ity futures contract necessitates turnover.
Second, a commodities customer may purchase a commodity futures contract with a smaller
deposit than is required to purchase securities. When coupled with the fact that commodities trad-
ers make their money solely from price changes and not from any periodic payments during the life
of the investment (such as dividends on stock or interest on bonds), this high leverage increases
sensitivity to price fluctuations and may impel quick trading activity to cut losses or to add to
favorable positions.
Finally, commissions on commodities transactions are computed differently than securities trans-
actions. See generally 2 P. JOHNSON, supra note 35, § 5.45; Lowe, supra note 2, at 326-27.
56. The CFTC has commented that the various objective indicators used to measure excessive
trading in a securities account may also be applied to a commodities account, provided due regard
is given to the economic differences between securities and commodities transactions. McGaughey
v. Hogan-Orr, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,076, at 24,348 &
n.3 (CFTC July 31, 1980), aff'd in part and modified, rev'd in part on other grounds, [1984-1986
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,479 (CFTC Jan. 2, 1985); Standards of Conduct
for Commodity Trading Professionals for the Protection of Customers, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742, 44,746
(1977) (proposed Sept. 6, 1977), withdrawn as to churning, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, 31,889 (1978)).
The one objective indicator the CFTC does not use, however, is turnover ratio. The CFTC has
ruled that fundamental differences between securities and futures contracts make turnover ratio, as
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excessiveness, the burden shifts to the broker to rebut the objective evidence
by demonstrating that the account was traded according to a system.57
C. BROKER'S STATE OF MIND
To justify imposing liability on the broker for excessive trading, a cus-
tomer must establish the state of mind normally required for recovery under
the particular antifraud section serving as the basis for the suit.58 This has
developed in securities cases, inherently inappropriate for determining excessive trading in a com-
modities account. In re Lincolnwood Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,986, at 28,247 (CFTC Jan. 31, 1984).
At least one commentator has argued that the objective tests used to measure excessiveness in
securities cases have no meaning at all in a commodities context, not just that the numbers must be
higher to be significant. See Lowe, supra note 2, at 338. Lowe contends that in light of the economic
differences between securities and commodities trading, the CFTC and courts should abandon rec-
ognition of a cause of action for churning in commodities cases and substitute instead a trade-by-
trade suitability inquiry. Id. at 341-43. Numerous decisions, however, have rejected the existence of
a suitability standard under the Commodity Exchange Act. See generally Phacelli v. Conticom-
modity Servs., Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,250, at 32,674
(CFTC Sept. 5, 1986) (futures merchant not in violation of Commodity Exchange Act merely be-
cause of failure to determine whether customer suitable for commodities trading).
Several commentators have argued that economic differences and complexities in the options
market suggest the need for differences in approach with respect to determining excessive trading in
churning claims of stock option accounts as well. See generally Packard, supra note I, at 232-44;
Poser, supra note 1, at 607-08.
57. Dunn v. Contemporary Fin. Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
22,955, at 31,779-80 (CFTC Feb. 25, 1986) (defendants carry burden of demonstrating legitimate
basis for trading strategy and showing strategy was reasonably consistent with the customer's trad-
ing objectives); Parciasepe v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,464, at 30,067 (CFTC Jan. 2, 1985) (once customer establishes prima facie
showing of excessive trading based on objective evidence, burden shifts to broker to produce evi-
dence of legitimate basis for trading strategy).
58. Most private claims for churning of a securities account are brought under the general an-
tifraud provisions found in § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act. See supra notes 26-27 for the
text of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v,
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), a plaintiff must establish scienter on the part of the defendant to
recover under these provisions. A showing of negligence is insufficient. Id. at 193. Whether reck-
less conduct will suffice remains an open question. Id. at 194 n. 12; see supra note 39 (appellate cases
applying Hochfelder in churning context and endorsing either intent or recklessness as sufficient).
A customer may also attempt to bring an implied private cause of action for churning of a securi-
ties account under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act. There is some question, however, as to whether such a
cause of action exists under § 17(a). See supra note 29 (discussing decisions recognizing or denying
private right of action under § 17(a)). If an implied cause of action is recognized under § 17(a), it
seems likely that negligence may well be sufficient for recovery under either § 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a)(2) (1982), or § 17(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3) (1982). For a discussion of the importance
of the Supreme Court's holding in Aaron v. SEC, 440 U.S. 680 (1980), on this question, see supra
note 29.
A customer may bring a reparations proceeding before the CFTC (under § 14 of the Commodity
Exchange Act) or a private cause of action in federal district court for churning of a commodities
account in violation of the general antifraud provision in § 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act.
See supra notes 33-34, 36-37 and accompanying text. The CFTC has held that negligence is suffi-
cient for liability under § 4b. See Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer
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generally not been problematic since the nature of a churning offense is such
that proof of the substantive violation almost invariably establishes the requi-
site state of mind. Once the customer has proven control of the account by
the broker and excessive trading, proof that the broker intended to reap prof-
its for himself and therefore possessed the necessary level of culpability is
virtually a foregone conclusion. 59
D. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
If a customer establishes a prima facie showing of churning, a broker can
assert a variety of affirmative defenses, including ratification, estoppel,
waiver, failure to mitigate damages, laches, and statute of limitations. 60 In
the context of a churning suit, all of these defenses revolve around the effect,
if any, of a customer's failure to act in the face of regular receipt of trade
confirmation slips and account statements. 61 While many of these defenses
share a common theme of delay by the plaintiff in objecting, they each repre-
sent distinct legal theories with different elements of proof.62 These subtle-
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,981 (CFTC Apr. 10, 1980) (breach of fiduciary
duty, even if committed negligently, constitutes fraud under § 4b), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc. v. CFTC, 673 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1982). This approach has not met
with great approval in the courts. Focusing on the language of § 4b, the legislative history, and the
Supreme Court's analysis in Hochfelder, numerous courts have held that more than negligence is
required for liability under § 4b. See Hill v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 790 F.2d 817, 821-
23 (10th Cir. 1986) (no liability under § 4b based upon mere negligence, mistake, or inadvertence);
McIlroy v. Dittmer, 732 F.2d 98, 102 (8th Cir. 1984) (proof of more than mere carelessness re-
quired for § 4b violation); Evanston Bank v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1014, 1022-
24 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (scienter or recklessness required for § 4b violation); McCarthy v. Paine Web-
ber, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 933, 938-41 (N.D. Ill. 1985). See generally 2 P. JOHNSON, supra note 35,
§ 5.39 (discussing application of scienter standards in § 4b cases).
59. See Shad v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 799 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1986) (scienter usually
not established by direct evidence, but rather inferred from finding of excessive trading and control).
The opinion of the Second Circuit in Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1983), is illustra-
tive of the conclusory treatment normally given to this element of the plaintiff's case. In Armstrong,
the court simply stated that "[c]hurning, in and of itself, may be a deceptive and manipulative
device under section 10(b), the scienter required by section 10(b) being implicit in the nature of the
conduct." Id. at 91.
For a rare example of a more extensive discussion of the scienter element in a churning case, see
Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (rejecting
finding of fraudulent intent where millionaire plaintiff sued broker of 17 years for churning after
substantial losses resulted from the use of trading system that had previously produced gains), aff'd,
560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977).
60. See, e.g., Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 1984) (failure to
mitigate damages); Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1370 (7th Cir. 1983) (waiver,
estoppel, laches, ratification); Dzentis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168,
171-73 (10th Cir. 1974) (statute of limitations); Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365,
373-74 (1st Cir.) (estoppel), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973).
61. See Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1370 (7th Cir. 1983) (investor who fails
to object upon receipt of trading confirmations may be barred by waiver, estopppel, laches, or
ratification).
62. See generally 5C A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 1OB-5 §§ 235.01-
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ties, however, often disappear in judicial decisions, especially in churning
cases. Churning opinions invariably treat the various affirmative defenses in
a lump sum fashion with little or no differentiation. 63
E. DAMAGES
Courts have struggled to fashion the proper measure of damages for a cus-
tomer injured by churning. 64 The method devised in early securities cases,
and probably still most frequently used in both the securities and commodi-
ties context, awards damages in the amount of commissions and interest paid
to the broker during the period of the offense.65 Since churning is excessive
trading of a customer's account for the purpose of generating commissions,
237.04 (1985) (discussing and differentiating defenses of statute of limitations, laches, waiver, estop-
pel, and ratification).
63. See Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1370 (7th Cir. 1983) (treating waiver,
estoppel, laches, and ratification in aggregate on review ofjury verdict); Sutton v. Shearson Hayden
Stone, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 99, 100-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (treating waiver and estoppel together for
purposes of passing on motion to dismiss complaint); Rankl v. Elkins, Stroud, Suplee & Co., [1 981
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,827, at 90,119 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1980) (treating
ratification, waiver, and estoppel in group fashion for purposes of evaluating motion for summary
judgment); Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (finding
customer barred from recovery under principles of waiver, estoppel, and laches without differentia-
tion).
For a rare example of precise differentiation between defenses, compare the trial court opinion in
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 422 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (holding customer barred
as to suitability claims, but not as to churning, under principles of waiver, estoppel, and laches
treated without differentiation), modified in part on other grounds and aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
1970), with the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in the same case on review, 430 F.2d at 1207-09
(differentiating the three theories and holding that although trial court failed to make findings nec-
essary to support defense of waiver, findings were sufficient to support application of estoppel and
laches).
64. See Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1054 n.26 (7th Cir. 1974) (unlikely that rule can be
designed to cover all combinations of facts and complications beyond generalization that damages
should compensate customer approximately for losses sustained as proximate result of churning);
Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 216 (D. Mass. 1978) (difficult to
fashion general rule for all situations). See generally Brodsky, Measuring Damages in Churning and
Suitability Claims, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 157, 165-66 (1978) (proposing introduction of expert testimony
to compare actual trading results in churned account with results of hypothetically well managed
account); Poser, supra note 1, at 577 n.44 (analyzing methods of calculating damages); Note, Mea-
suring Damages in Suitability and Churning Actions under Rule 10b-5, 25 B.C.L. REV. 839, 859-63
(1984) (endorsing modified rescissory approach); Note, supra note I, at 883-85 (endorsing loss of
bargain recovery); Comment, Churning and the Death of Low Risk Larceny: Calculating Damages
to Redress the Churning Client's Loss in Portfolio Value, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 149, 163-73 (1984)
(endorsing modified rescissory approach).
65. Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 826 (9th Cir. 1980); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d
251, 259 (4th Cir. 1975); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 1970);
Zaretsky v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 509 F. Supp. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich
& Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 216 (D. Mass. 1978); see Lehman v. Madda Trading Co., [1984-
1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,417, at 29,870 (CFTC Nov. 13, 1984)
(traditional quasi-contractual theory limits damages to commissions, fees, taxes, and interest in-
curred by overtrading).
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this mode of recovery focuses on the unjust enrichment of the broker and
strips him of his gains.66
While this quasi-contractual approach is appealing because of its ease of
application, 67 it is not without some obvious shortcomings. An award based
on the broker's gain may bear little relation to the customer's loss. Some
securities churning cases recognize that churning may adversely affect the
underlying value of a customer's portfolio. These courts adopt an out-of-
pocket measure of damages to compensate the customer for decline in portfo-
lio value.68 Under this theory of damages, the customer essentially receives a
66. See Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 216 (D. Mass. 1978)
(quasi-contractual method most appropriate because broker required to return all benefits received).
The quasi-contractual theory of damages may be criticized in one sense as overinclusive. Deci-
sions utilizing this method of recovery make no effort to determine how much of the broker's gain is
ill gotten. They simply award damages based upon the entire amount of commissions paid. Id.
The customer, however, has been damaged with respect to commissions only to the extent that the
commissions paid were excessive. Thus, it would seem more appropriate theoretically to calculate
an award of commissions based on the difference between commissions actually paid and the
amount of commissions that would have been paid if the account had not been churned. Admit-
tedly, such an award would be more difficult to estimate. See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283
F. Supp. 417, 440 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (award of commissions theoretically should be limited to those
attributable to "excessive" transactions, as opposed to transactions not excessive under the circum-
stances; however, because of difficulty in making this distinction with precision, wrongdoer cannot
complain of award based on total commissions), modified in part and aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202, 1211-12
(9th Cir. 1970); see also Note, supra note 64, at 844 (quasi-contractual award may overcompensate
plaintiff); Note, supra note 1, at 884 (award of commissions theoretically should be confined to
commissions paid in excess of those which would have been earned from a legitimately managed
account; however, because of difficulty of estimating this figure, award of total commissions is more
sensible).
In focusing solely on commissions, however, the quasi-contractual measure of damages can also
be criticized as underinclusive because no damages are awarded for declines in portfolio value prox-
imately caused by churning. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing out-of-pocket
measure of damages in securities cases).
67. See Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 259 (4th Cir. 1975) (awarding commissions rather than
lost equity because former easy to ascertain, while latter indeterminable on facts of case and
speculative).
68. See Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 730-33, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 222, 249-51 (1968) (awarding lost equity, computed as starting value of account plus assumed
earnings, reduced by ending value of account and cash distributions to customer).
In Twomey the court awarded out-of-pocket damages as an alternative to a quasi-contractual
award. Id. Other courts have recognized that a customer may suffer both types of injury from
churning and use the out-of-pocket method to supplement an award of commissions. See infra
notes 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing decisions applying both remedies).
Whether used as an alternative to a quasi-contractual award or as a supplement, the out-of-
pocket theory has most often been invoked in securities churning cases that also involve suitability
violations-i.e., allegations by the customer that the broker not only overtraded the account in
terms of the volume and frequency of transactions, but also violated his duty to make trades qualita-
tively suited to the customer's financial situation and needs. See Twomey, 262 Cal. App. 2d at 730-
33, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 249-51 (defendants negligently advised plaintiff to switch into unsuitable invest-
ments in breach of fiduciary duty); see also Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 326 (5th
Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (customer harmed by broker's conclusion of transactions unsuitable for
investor); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 826 (9th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff's claim of
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rescissory award, calculated as the difference between the starting value of
his account and its ending value.69 In contrast to the quasi-contractual ap-
proach, the out-of-pocket theory attempts to focus on the actual harm to the
customer; however, it is not without its own analytical difficulties. 70 A pure
out-of-pocket award essentially restores the plaintiff to the full starting value
of his account as if the account had been dormant. It operates on the as-
sumption that all transactions in the account were invalid and thus fails to
take into consideration any factors extrinsic to the churning that may have
caused the account to decline in value.71
unsuitability of securities purchased encompasses trading losses). See infra note 140 for a discus-
sion of the suitability doctrine in securities cases.
The CFTC has consistently declined to read into § 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act a require-
ment that commodity professionals determine a customer's suitability to trade futures contracts. See
Phacelli v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,250, at 32,674 (CFTC Sept. 5, 1986) (commodity professional does not violate § 4b by mere
failure to determine customers' suitability for commodity trading); accord Schofield v. First Com-
modity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1986) (no cause of action against broker for failure to advise
customer that particular investment unsuitable). This does not mean, however, that the CFTC has
entirely ruled out the possibility of awarding damages under an out-of-pocket approach.
The CFTC recognizes the quasi-contractual theory as the normal measure of recovery in repara-
tions proceedings. Lehman v. Madda Trading Co., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,417, at 29,871 (CFTC Nov. 13, 1984). Given the highly volatile nature of the
commodities markets and the fact that many well managed accounts lose money, the CFTC believes
it is improper to assume that a broker's churning is necessarily the proximate cause of a customer's
trading loss. Id. at 29,871. However, if a customer can establish the necessary causal connection by
proving that such losses would not have occurred if the account had not been churned, then a
customer may be entitled to recover trading losses. Id.; see McGinn v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., 736 F.2d 1254, 1256-58 (8th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging potential for recovery of
trading losses in addition to commissions in context of implied private cause of action for churning
under § 4b).
69. E.g., Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 730-33, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 222, 249-51 (1968).
70. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 327 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (criticizing
pure out-of-pocket approach and adopting modified rescissory approach to take into account gen-
eral market decline as measured by standard market index); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine,
288 F. Supp. 836, 849-50 (E.D. Va. 1968) (criticizing pure out-of-pocket approach and adopting
quasi-contractual approach as more certain). See generally Note, supra note 64, at 846-48; Note,
supra note 1, at 884.
71. The out-of-pocket approach presents two other theoretical problems. First, in the context of
securities churning cases, out-of-pocket recovery has frequently been tied to the presence of suitabil-
ity violations. Under this theory, churning of suitable securities might not warrant an award of
trading losses unless it could be established that the churning itself somehow caused the decline in
account value. See Brodsky, supra note 64, at 159. If the out-of-pocket approach is used as an
alternative rather than a supplement to an award of commissions, it is possible under this scenario
that an investor would recover no damages. In such a case it seems likely that a court would revert
to a quasi-contractual remedy.
Second, a pure out-of-pocket approach could also theoretically result in no damages if used in
lieu of the quasi-contractual model, when the customer's account experiences a net profit. See
Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 849 (E.D. Va. 1968) (criticizing out-of-
pocket theory in this regard). See generally Note, supra note 64, at 847-48. In this circumstance, a
court would also likely resort to the quasi-contractual remedy because the existence of a net profit
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To remedy the problems inherent in both approaches, other courts have
attempted blends and modifications of the two theories of recovery. These
courts recognize that a churning victim may suffer both excessive commis-
sions and decline in portfolio value and thus award a judgment based on both
the quasi-contractual approach and the out-of-pocket theory. 72 Moreover,
several opinions attempt to refine the out-of-pocket theory by adjusting the
difference between the customer's starting and ending account balance to re-
flect general market decline as measured by one of the standard securities
market indices.7 3 The measure of damages in churning cases, however, re-
mains a fertile area of litigation.
F. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROL ELEMENT IN A CHURNING CASE
Control of trading by the broker is the threshold issue in a churning case
and the very heart of a churning claim.74 Control is the driving force behind
the broker's fiduciary duty to place the customer's interest ahead of his own.
Abuse of that control is the gravamen of a churning offense.
Most discussions of the control element in churning cases, however, sim-
ply state that the issue of control is a question of fact to be determined in
has never been regarded by the SEC or the courts as a defense to a churning claim. See Zaretsky v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 509 F. Supp. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court rejected broker's contention that
customer's complaint insufficient for failure to plead actual damages as to churning count because
of net gain in portfolio value; quasi-contractual measure of damages would be appropriate relief).
72. See Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1984) (in securities
churning case investor may recover excessive commissions charged by broker and decline in portfo-
lio value caused by broker's fraudulent transactions; jury verdict that did not exceed commissions
paid plus loss on fraudulently-induced transaction upheld); McGinn v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., 736 F.2d 1254, 1256-58 (8th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging potential for recovery of
trading losses, in addition to commissions, in implied private cause of action for churning under
§ 4b of Commodity Exchange Act); see also Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 326-28
(5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (churning of unsuitable securities results in two distinct harms-exces-
sive commissions and decline in portfolio value; jury verdict allowing recovery for both, with latter
adjusted to take into account general market decline, affirmed).
73. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (affirming
trial court's instruction to reduce out-of-pocket damages award by average percentage decline in
value of Dow Jones Industrials or Standard & Poor's Index); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co.,
424 F. Supp. 1021, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (RolfI) (plaintiff cannot recover net losses for violation of
suitability and supervision rules; damages awarded based on quasi-contractual theory), aff'd in part
and remanded, 570 F.2d 38, 48-50 (2d Cir.) (Rol!lI) (developing method that adjusts out-of-pocket
losses by considering market indices and remanding to district court to recompute damages), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,919 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (RolfII), aff'd in part and remanded, 637 F.2d 77,
84-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (RolfIV) (recognizing discretion of district court on remand to use Standard
& Poor's Low Price Index for period in question). See generally Note, supra note 64, at 848-62.
74. For previous discussions of the control element in a churning case, see 1 S. GOLDBERG, supra
note 1, § 2.8; 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 212.01, at 9-120 to -123; N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS &
T. Russo, supra note 5, 2.11, at 2-56 to -57; Hyman, supra note 1, at 6-8; Lowe, supra note 2, at
331-32; Packard, supra note 1, at 224; Poser, supra note 1, at 579-81; Note, supra note 1, at 871-74;
Comment, supra note 1, at 281-84.
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light of the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the broker
and his customer. Apart from describing factual scenarios presented in vari-
ous cases, few commentators have attempted to analyze the rationale under-
lying the decisions in this area. The failure to do so is understandable since
the case law is in considerable disarray.
To say that the issue of control is a question of fact is not to say that this
issue cannot be subjected to a mode of analysis against which the question of
control may be answered with some degree of consistency. Such analysis
necessarily begins with an examination of the judicial and administrative
evolution of the concept of control. In this history lie the seeds of a possible
solution.
III. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL
A. THE EARLY SEC ENFORCEMENT CASES
Initial definition of the elements of a churning violation took place largely
in the context of SEC disciplinary proceedings against brokers. 75 As one
might expect in an enforcement context, these early cases present relatively
egregious factual situations in which churning is frequently only one of sev-
eral violations committed by the broker. A recurring fact pattern involves a
registered representative who creates a relationship of trust and confidence
with an unsophisticated customer, characterized by overtones of acting on
the customer's behalf. The registered representative then engages in transac-
tions with the customer purportedly as a principal, charging prices not rea-
sonably related to the market price and excessively trading the account. 76
In the excessive markup portions of these opinions, the SEC uses two ana-
lytical constructs to support a finding of fraudulent conduct by the broker-
dealer: the shingle theory and the fiduciary theory. Although these two the-
ories rest on different premises, they tend to blur in actual application. Both
place a heavy emphasis on the fact that the broker-dealer induced the cus-
tomer's reliance. This focus on customer reliance with respect to markups is
central to the Commission's churning analysis as well. 77
75. See Note, supra note 1, at 869 (commenting that as of late 1960s churning was primarily
dealt with by SEC through its enforcement of general broker-dealer antifraud provisions).
76. See, e.g., In re J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88 (1962), aff'dper curiam sub noma. Hersh v. SEC,
325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937 (1964); In re Looper & Co., 38 S.E.C. 294
(1958); In re R.H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467 (1955), aff'dper curiam, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956); In re Grubbs, 28 S.E.C. 323 (1948); In re Behel, Johnsen & Co.,
26 S.E.C. 163 (1947); In re Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865 (1946), aff'd, 177 F.2d 228
(D.C. Cir. 1949); In re E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347 (1945).
77. See, for example, the discussion of the SEC's analysis in In re E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18
S.E.C. 347 (1945), infra in text accompanying notes 97-116.
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Under the shingle theory the SEC maintains that regardless of his legal
capacity as an agent or principal, a broker-dealer implicitly represents by
"hanging out his shingle" that he will deal fairly with his customers in ac-
cordance with the standards and practices of his profession.78 One aspect of
this implied representation of fair dealing is that a dealer who functions as a
principal represents that he is trading at a price which bears some reasonable
relation to the market. If an unreasonable spread exists between the market
price and the dealer's trading price that is not disclosed to the customer, the
dealer breaches this implied representation and violates the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws.
Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC79 is an early case articulating the shingle
theory in the context of excessive markups. The SEC revoked the license of
the securities firm on the ground that the firm had charged unreasonable
spreads to a group of customers comprised of unsophisticated single women
and widows without adequate disclosure. 80 In affirming the Commission's
action, the Second Circuit judicially endorsed the shingle theory and noted:
An over-the-counter firm which actively solicits customers and then sells
them securities at prices as far above the market as were those which peti-
tioner charged here must be deemed to commit a fraud. It holds itself out
as competent to advise in the premises, and it should disclose the market
price if sales are to be made substantially above that level. Even consider-
ing petitioner as a principal in a simple vendor-purchaser transaction (and
there is doubt whether, in several instances at least, petitioner was actually
not acting as broker-agent for the purchasers, in which case all undisclosed
profits would be forfeited), it was still under a special duty, in view of its
expert knowledge and proffered advice, not to take advantage of its cus-
tomers' ignorance of market conditions. The key to the success of all of
petitioner's dealings was the confidence in itself which it managed to instill
in the customers. Once that confidence was established, the failure to re-
veal the mark-up pocketed by the firm was both an omission to state a
material fact and a fraudulent device. When nothing was said about mar-
ket price, the natural implication in the untutored minds of the purchasers
was that the price asked was close to the market. The law of fraud knows
no difference between express representation on the one hand and implied
misrepresentation or concealment on the other.81
In this passage, the Second Circuit assumed, arguendo, that the securities
firm was entitled to function as a principal with respect to its customers. The
78. In re Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 388 (1939). See generally 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 2,
§ 210.03, at 9-12 to -20; L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 951-58 (1983); N.
WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, supra note 5, 2.03, at 2-14, 2.09, at 2-43, 2.10.
79. 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944).
80. Id. at 435-36.
81. Id. at 436-37 (footnote omitted).
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court also noted, however, that this assumption was open to some question.
The court's reservation in this regard refers to the second theory frequently
employed by the SEC to bring unreasonable spreads in principal transactions
within the aegis of the antifraud provisions-the fiduciary theory. 82
The fiduciary theory is perhaps best articulated in another SEC opinion
sustained on judicial review involving a broker-dealer also coincidentally
named Hughes. In In re Arleen W. Hughes, 83 the Commission held that if a
broker-dealer creates a relationship of trust and confidence with his customer
in which the customer relies on the broker-dealer, the broker-dealer cannot
negate the fiduciary overtones of this relationship simply by purporting to
confirm as principal. 84 In such circumstances, the SEC will disregard the
form of the transaction and imply the existence of an agency relationship. 85
When the parties' relationship is restructured in this fashion, undisclosed
markups become ill-gotten secret profits.8 6 The dealer-turned-broker violates
his fiduciary duty to disclose his adverse interest to the customer and act in
the customer's best interest.87
The shingle theory outlaws excessive markups through the fiction of an
implied representation of fair dealing. 88 Through this mechanism it creates a
case that is analogous to the typical transactional fraud suit in which a plain-
tiff complains about some misrepresentation or omission on the part of the
defendant.89 Technically, the shingle theory flows not from the existence of
any agency obligation, but from the status of the broker-dealer as a trading
professional.90 Thus, as posited by the court in Charles Hughes, the shingle
theory theoretically could apply even to a dealer operating at arm's length
with a customer.91 By way of contrast, the fiduciary theory reaches the prob-
lem of excessive markups by converting the dealer from a principal into an
implied agent.92
82. See generally 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 210.03, at 9-20; L. Loss, supra note 78, at 958,
963-68; N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, supra note 5, 2.03, at 2-14, 2.09, at 2-40 to -41.
83. 27 S.E.C. 629 (1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
84. 27 S.E.C. at 634-39.
85. Id. at 638-39; eg., In re Allender Co., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1053-55 (1941).
86. Allender Co., 9 S.E.C. at 1053-55.
87. Id.
88. See 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 210.03, at 9-18 ("The approach is a fiction-you imply a
representation (which the broker has no intention of making) and then impose liability when it is
breached.").
89. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing transactional fraud suits).
90. L. Loss, supra note 78, at 951 ("This has nothing to do with any agency obligation. The
theory is that even a dealer at arm's length impliedly represents when he hangs out his shingle that
he will deal fairly with the public.").
91. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786
(1944).
92. See 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 210.03, at 9-20 n.31 ("This approach is also referred to as
the implied agency theory.").
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Notwithstanding these analytical differences, the two doctrines share one
important theme in application-the presence of customer reliance. While
the shingle theory could theoretically be used to reach a dealer operating at
arm's length with his customer, in practice the doctrine has most often been
invoked in cases that place considerable import on the fact that the dealer
garnered the customer's trust and confidence even though he purported to
act for his own account.93 As the Second Circuit emphasized in Charles
Hughes,94 it was the fact that the securities firm fostered an environment of
trust and confidence on the part of its customers which justified implication
of certain representations under the shingle theory. Similarly, creation of a
relationship of trust and confidence with the customer is what justifies the
implied agency status of a dealer under the fiduciary theory.
95
Thus, although analytically different, the shingle theory and fiduciary the-
ory often dovetail in application and frequently appear alternatively in the
same case.96 Used in this fashion, both doctrines focus on exploitation by the
broker of the confidence placed in him by the customer in the context of their
ongoing relationship. This emphasis on the relational reliance of the cus-
tomer-developed in the context of excessive markups-carries over signifi-
cantly into the SEC's churning analysis as well.
In determining the existence of a churning violation, early SEC enforce-
ment opinions never actually articulate the question as one of control over
the account. Instead, the inquiry is phrased in terms of relational reliance.
For example, in the Commission's very first churning case, In re E.H. Rollins
& Sons, Inc., 97 the SEC brought disciplinary proceedings against the firm of
E.H. Rollins and one of its salesmen, Walter Rawls, for mismanagement of
93. See id. § 210.03, at 9-14 to -15 & n.13 (noting that application of shingle theory to dealers
turns on whether dealer gained customer's confidence, but arguing that shingle theory should apply
to dealers across the board); L. Loss, supra note 78, at 954-55 (noting that most cases involve
element of advice by dealer and disparity in degree of knowledge possessed by dealer and customer,
but arguing that shingle theory should apply regardless of such factors); N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS
& T. Russo, supra note 5, 2.03, at 2-15 (shingle theory originated in cases involving trust and
confidence relationship with customers but has been expanded).
94. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786
(1944).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85 (discussing cases in which SEC implied existence of
agency relationship).
96. For examples of cases employing both the shingle theory and the fiduciary theory, see In re
Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 881-90 (1946), aff'd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949), and
In re Allender Co., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1053-58 (1941). See 5B A. JAcoBs, supra note 2, § 210.03, at 9-20
to -21 & nn. 32-34 (noting overlap between two theories and tendency of SEC to rely more heavily
on shingle theory); L. Loss, supra note 78, at 968 (arriving at same conclusion, but arguing that
better approach would be greater use of fiduciary theory); N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo,
supra note 5, T 2.03, at 2-15 (noting lack of distinct boundaries between two theories and arguing
that cumulative effect is to eliminate common law distinction between broker-agent and dealer-
principal; conduct of broker-dealer and relationship to customer determine duties owed).
97. 18 S.E.C. 347 (1945).
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accounts opened to invest monies belonging to two special work funds of the
Board of Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church.98 The firm had ob-
tained the accounts because Rawls' brother was treasurer of one of the
funds.99 Rawls dealt with his brother when engaging in transactions with
that fund and with a Mrs. Fulton when trading with the other fund.l°° As in
many of the enforcement cases that followed, the Commission pointed to
multiple violations of the securities laws. In particular, the respondents were
charged with taking excessive spreads in principal transactions, churning the
accounts, extending credit for periods greater than permitted by the Federal
Reserve Board, engaging in fictitious transactions, and falsifying ledger ac-
counts.101 In addition, Rawls was charged with increasing prices on certain
trades and secretly rebating the increase to his brother.102 The Commission
found against the respondents on all charges.103
In the portion of the opinion dealing with excessive markups, the evidence
established that Mrs. Fulton placed complete trust and confidence in Rawls
and E.H. Rollins.' 0 4 Rawls assured her that he had a special interest in the
accounts of the missions because of their religious nature and that he was
giving the funds his best thought and attention. 05 When the funds had
money available to invest, Rawls submitted recommendations that the funds
invariably followed.10 6 Indeed, Rawls often engaged in transactions with the
funds without prior consultation with the customer, confident that his rec-
ommendations would be accepted.10 7 On this record, the SEC raised the
specter of the fiduciary theory. 10 8 Although the firm confirmed all transac-
tions with the funds as principal, the Commission questioned whether the
respondents were entitled to deal with the funds as principal or obligated to
act as agents.' 0 9 The Commission, however, chose not to answer this ques-
tion because the evidence was somewhat mixed. Instead, it rested its finding
of violation with respect to the markups on the shingle theory."10
Without determining the precise character of the legal relationship be-
tween the parties, the Commission noted that in light of the trust and confi-
98. Id. at 349.
99. Id. at 350.
100. Id. at 352.
101. Id. at 349.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 374-75 (excessive spreads); id. at 378-79 (fictitious transactions and falsified ledgers);
id. at 380 (churning); id. at 385 (secret rebates); id. at 386 (credit violations).
104. Id. at 353.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 353-54.
107. Id. at 354.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 354-55.
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dence instilled by respondents and the reliance that they had induced, the
firm and Rawls were obligated to adhere to a course of fair dealing with the
funds."' This obligation included an implicit representation that their trad-
ing prices would bear some reasonable relation to the market. 112 When the
respondents charged prices that were excessive, they breached this represen-
tation and violated the antifraud provisions in section 17(a) of the 1933 Act
and section 15(c)(1) of the 1934 Act. 113
The emphasis on the respondents' exploitation of the customer's confi-
dence in the markup discussion also dominates the Commission's treatment
of the churning aspects of the case. Evidence of in-and-out trading and a
statistical analysis of the portfolios satisfied the agency that the accounts had
been overtraded. 114 The SEC assessed responsibility for this overtrading in
terms of relational reliance. In finding the respondents liable for a violation
of section 15(c)(1), the Commission stated:
Of course a dealer cannot be held guilty of overtrading in an account where
transactions are initiated by the customer. In that case the profit drain on
the account is the responsibility of the customer and not the dealer. On the
other hand, in order to determine a dealer's culpability for overtrading it is
not necessary that we find him to have a discretionary power over the ac-
count in a formal sense. The heart of the inquiry is not nomenclature or
form but fact. Does the dealer occupy such a status with respect to the
customer that he may be held responsible for excessive trading in such cus-
tomer's account? ... On the basis of what has already been said we think
there is no doubt that Rawls occupied that status with respect to Woman'sWork. 115
As we have noted, Rawls habitually took the initiative in trades effected
for Woman's Work, and Mrs. Fulton placed great reliance on him, pursu-
ant to his solicitation, throughout the period under discussion .... On the
basis of all the evidence we find that Rawls induced excessive trading in the
Woman's Work account, in pursuance of a scheme that operated as a fraud
thereon .... 116
The enforcement cases involving churning subsequent to Rollins mirror
the structure and language of that opinion. Almost all of the proceedings
involve relatively unsophisticated customers and allege at a minimum unrea-
sonable spreads in principal transactions and churning on the part of the
dealer. In each case, the SEC notes that the dealer induced the reliance of
111. Id.
112. Id. at 362.
113. Id. at 374-75.
114. Id. at 380-81.
115. Id. at 380.
116. Id. at 382.
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the customer and then invokes the shingle theory, the fiduciary theory, or
both to support a finding of violation with respect to the markups.' 17 If an
analysis of the portfolio also shows excessive trading, the Commission then
recites that the broker-dealer initiated most trading activity, that the cus-
tomer invariably accepted his investment recommendations, and that the
customer relied on the broker-dealer. 118
The litany-like nature of the Commission's discussion sometimes makes it
unclear whether it regards initiation of trades by the broker, routine accept-
ance of recommendations by the customer, and lack of customer sophistica-
tion as factors bearing on a finding of reliance and subsumed therein or as
factors separate from the issue of customer reliance. 19 This may be the
source of the confusion in early judicial decisions that used SEC precedents
to fashion the control element in private damage actions brought by custom-
ers. The former view, that these are factors bearing on a finding of customer
reliance, is clearly the correct interpretation.
Customer reliance induced by the broker is the sine qua non needed to
impose liability for overtrading. Evidence that a customer was unsophistica-
ted, that the broker initiated trading, and that the customer invariably fol-
lowed the broker's recommendations is highly relevant to a finding of
reliance. No one of these facts, however, is a prerequisite for liability or
independently determinative thereof. These factors assume significance only
to the extent that they bear on the question of reliance.
As might be expected in an enforcement context, most of the early discipli-
nary proceedings did involve customers with a very low degree of sophistica-
tion in business and financial matters, who blindly followed their broker's
117. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 76. The case of In re Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C.
865 (1946), aff'd, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949), is illustrative. The SEC revoked the registration
of a brokerage firm for extensive cross-trading of unlisted, closely-held stocks in an artificial market
composed almost entirely of itself and its customers. The SEC based its findings that the respon-
dent's pricing practices were unreasonable on both the shingle and fiduciary theories. Id. at 881-86.
118. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 76. Norris & Hirshberg is again illustrative. In addition to
pricing violations, the SEC found that the brokerage firm had churned its customers' accounts.
Although the Commission confined its specific findings to accounts in which the firm held express
discretionary power, it noted that churning may arise in nondiscretionary accounts "whenever the
broker or dealer is in a position to determine the volume and frequency of transactions by reason of
the customer's willingness to follow the suggestions of the broker or dealer and he abuses the cus-
tomers [sic] confidence by overtrading." 21 S.E.C. at 890.
119. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 76. See, in particular, In re Grubbs, 28 S.E.C. 323, 325
(1948) (SEC notes that customer testified she had no experience in business world, she had great
trust and confidence in broker, she relied on his judgment almost completely, and he kept in fre-
quent touch with her, making numerous trading suggestions that she almost always followed); In re
Behel, Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163, 165 (1947) (SEC notes firm's churning activities were directed
at investment accounts of three women, including two elderly widows; all women were uninformed
as to investment matters, relied completely on broker's advice, and almost always accepted broker's
recommendations).
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advice. 120 Even when the customer was arguably more sophisticated or ac-
tive, however, the SEC nonetheless sustained a churning violation if other
evidence established that the broker had induced the reliance of the cus-
tomer. For example, in In re Cea, 121 the Commission rejected the conten-
tions of two salesmen that they did not have de facto discretionary power
over the accounts of a comptroller and an engineer.122 Notwithstanding that
the customers' occupations may have suggested a higher degree of sophistica-
tion than that typically found in enforcement cases, the Commission ac-
cepted the customers' testimony that they placed complete reliance on the
judgment of their brokers.123 Conversely, the only enforcement proceeding
to reject a finding of churning did so because of a lack of reliance on the part
of the customers even though by background they appeared to be relatively
unsophisticated. 124
A careful reading of the SEC enforcement cases shows that the presence of
customer reliance induced by the broker is the touchstone of the agency's
analysis.125 Initiation of trading by the broker, acceptance of recommenda-
120. See, eg., cases cited supra note 76. The case of In re R.H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467
(1955), aff'dper curiam, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956), is particularly
illustrative. The customers whose accounts were chosen by the SEC for scrutiny included an eld-
erly widow and her daughter, id. at 470, a disabled veteran and former house painter with little
education, id. at 472, a retired secretary, id. at 474, the postmistress and operator of a general store
in a small rural town, id. at 476, a steamfitter who had no prior trading experience, id. at 477, and a
retired college administrator and his retired schoolteacher sister, id. at 479.
121. 44 S.E.C. 8 (1969).
122. Id. at 18-20.
123. Id.
124. In re Thomson & McKinnon, 35 S.E.C. 451, 456-57 (1953). In Thomson & McKinnon, the
SEC affirmed a finding that the respondent brokerage firm had not induced the high volume of
trading found in two customers' accounts. Id. at 454. One customer had been a railroad brakeman,
an elementary school teacher, and an operator of a small interstate trucking business. He opened an
account with the firm about six months after obtaining a $58,000 judgment against the railroad for
personal injuries. Id. The Commission noted that the customer relied on his own judgment in
making trades, that he did not receive recommendations from the firm, that he subscribed to outside
market services, and that he made daily visits to the respondent's office during which he frequently
offered advice to other customers. On this evidence, the Commission held that the firm was not
responsible for the activity in the customer's account. Id. at 456.
The other customer was a widow who had been in the restaurant business with her husband. Id.
at 455. The SEC noted that although the firm made recommendations to her regarding trading, she
was responsible for the frequency of her transactions. She switched from a cash to a margin ac-
count to purchase more securities without any suggestion from the firm. Moreover, she gave discre-
tionary power over her account to an accountant recommended by the firm. The accountant
executed almost half of the transactions in her account. The SEC held on these facts that the firm
had not induced the active trading in her account. Id. at 456-57.
125. It should be noted that this emphasis on customer reliance in SEC churning opinions arises
from the fact that excessive trading must be induced by the broker to be wrongful at all, not from
any general requirement that the SEC prove customer reliance before imposing disciplinary sanc-
tions. The SEC usually is not required to prove customer reliance in an enforcement context. For
example, although a private plaintiff generally must establish reliance to recover for transactional
fraud in an implied cause of action under rule 10b-5, the SEC is not required to prove customer
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tions by the customer, and the degree of customer sophistication are factors
that bear on the ultimate inquiry of reliance, but they are not independently
determinative thereof.
The early enforcement cases exhibit one final tendency worth mentioning:
in reaching a finding with respect to churning, other aspects of the case fre-
quently influence the Commission.1 26 Disciplinary proceedings invariably in-
volve multiple violations, and the presence of other misconduct by the broker
clearly hurts defense of the churning claim. In Rollins, for example, the
Commission noted that although reasonable prices would not have been a
defense to the churning claim, the excessive nature of the markups did serve
to underscore the evil of overtrading.127 Similarly, in In re Grubbs,125 the
SEC held that while the volume and frequency of transactions might not
necessarily require a conclusion of churning, when coupled with a secret
profits problem, the overall method of handling the account supported a find-
ing of excessive trading.I29 This tendency to interrelate theoretically distinct
aspects of the suit is less explicit, but nonetheless present in subsequent judi-
cial opinions involving churning. 130
B. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL
The main arena for defining the elements of a churning violation soon be-
came private actions rather than SEC disciplinary proceedings. Building on
the Commission's recognition of churning as a violation of the general an-
tifraud provisions in section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the
1934 Act, dissatisfied customers began filing suits seeking damages for churn-
ing under theories of implied civil liability. As might be expected, the first
significant judicial decision in this area borrowed heavily from SEC prece-
dents. In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,' 3' the plaintiff was an elderly
widow who emigrated from England as a young woman following two years
of education at a teacher's college. She held a variety of positions in her
reliance to sanction misrepresentations or omissions in violation of the antifraud provisions in en-
forcement proceedings. See In re Cea, 44 S.E.C. 8, 15 (1969) (no requirement to show reliance to
establish violations of antifraud provisions). See generally N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo,
supra note 5, at 1 2.06.
126. See Note, supra note 1, at 869 ("[flew of the cases in which the SEC has considered the
question have concerned churning alone; typically, the offense is committed in conjunction with
other violations so that it is not possible to isolate its effects either on the customer's account or on
the Commission's choice of sanctions").
127. In re E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 381 n.50 (1945) (discussed supra text accom-
panying notes 97-116).
128. 28 S.E.C. 323 (1948).
129. Id. at 329-30.
130. See infra note 283 and accompanying text (discussing judicial tendency to interrelate theo-
retically distinct parts of case when deciding control issue).




adult life, generally as either a saleswoman or private tutor. Around the age
of fifty she accepted employment as a housekeeper and tutor in the home of
Herbert Hecht, an import-export businessman. The plaintiff worked for Mr.
Hecht for fourteen years and married him two years prior to his death. 132
Long before she began to work for Mr. Hecht and throughout her employ-
ment in his home, plaintiff allocated a considerable portion of her modest
earnings to investment in the stock market. Over the years she built up an
equity of $65,000 on relatively inactive trading. 133 Following the death of
her husband, Mrs. Hecht deposited $7,500 with defendant Asa Wilder to
open a commodities account. Mrs. Hecht was acquainted with Wilder be-
cause he had done some trading on behalf of her husband. She instructed
Wilder to start her in soybeans when he thought the time was right. Shortly
after opening the commodities account, Mrs. Hecht also transferred her ex-
isting securities account to Wilder, together with $500,000 worth of stock
distributed from Mr. Hecht's estate.' 34
Mrs. Hecht traded through Wilder for approximately seven years, first
with the firm of Hooker & Fay and then with defendant Harris, Upham &
Co.' 35 Wilder telephoned her almost every morning, and she often called
him during the day. She also reviewed her copies of confirmation slips with
him during weekly visits that he made to her home. After these visits, how-
ever, Wilder would take the account information back to his home even
though he already had duplicates for his own use.136 In addition to the
monthly account statements generated by the office, Wilder prepared for
Mrs. Hecht annual summaries of her accounts. The court found, however,
that these summaries were designed to emphasize gain and allay fears of ex-
cessive trading.1 37
Throughout the seven years that she traded through Wilder, Mrs. Hecht
retained outside accountants, who prepared her annual tax returns based
upon schedules of capital gains and losses provided by Wilder.138 At the end
of that time, the accountants informed Mrs. Hecht that her portfolio had
deteriorated substantially and was worth approximately half of its beginning
balance.1 39 Mrs. Hecht sued Harris, Upham & Co. and Wilder under section
17(a) of the 1933 Act, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and rule lOb-5, alleging
suitability violations and churning. 4°
132. 283 F. Supp. at 423.
133. Id. at 423-24.
134. Id. at 424.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 426.
137. Id. at 434.
138. Id. at 426.
139. Id. at 424.
140. Id. at 426-27. Suitability refers to a broker-dealer's obligation to know the customer. The
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The defendants contended that Mrs. Hecht was an experienced and in-
formed trader who was conversant with the risks of the market by virtue of
her prior trading experience, her association with Mr. Hecht, and her regular
reading of the financial papers.141 The court dismissed Mrs. Hecht's suitabil-
ity claims, holding that her knowledge and experience, coupled with her reg-
ular receipt of account information, were sufficient to estop her from
complaining about the speculative nature of the transactions in her ac-
count.142 The court, however, sustained the charge of churning, 143 finding
that Mrs. Hecht's knowledge and experience were insufficient for determin-
ing whether the frequency and volume of trading in her account were exces-
sive. 144 The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 145
In defining the elements of a private action for churning, the district court
in Hecht made only passing reference to reliance. 146 It phrased the question
NASD requires that in recommending a purchase or sale of a particular security to a customer, the
broker-dealer must have "reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for
such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security
holdings and as to his financial situations and needs." N.A.S.D. RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE art. III,
§ 2, N.A.S.D. Manual (CCH) % 2152, at 2051 (1985).
On its face the rule does not mandate that the broker conduct an investigation of the customer's
objectives. It simply states that the broker must act reasonably based on the information, if any,
that the customer does provide. Whether a broker has an affirmative duty of inquiry under the
NASD's suitability rule is a disputed issue. See 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 211.01 [b], at 9-54 to -
56 & n.11.
Both the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange impose an affirmative
obligation on member brokers to know their customers. See N.Y.S.E. Rule 405, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide
(CCh) 2405, at 3697-3701 (1982) (requires members and member firms to use "due diligence to
learn the essential facts relative to every customer and to every order or account accepted"); A.S.E.
Rule 411, 2 A.S.E. Guide (CCH) I 9431, at 2647 (1978).
In the wake of recent Supreme Court opinions restricting implication of private causes of action,
the weight of authority is against the existence of a private remedy for violation of the rules of self-
regulatory organizations. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 28, at 863. If, however, the suita-
bility violation amounts to fraud and the customer can establish the normal elements of a rule lob-5
claim, then a violation of the suitability requirements of the various self-regulatory organizations
may be actionable in an implied private cause of action under rule lOb-5. T. HAZEN, supra note 29,
§ 10.7, at 277. See generally 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 2, § 211.01[b]; N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS &
T. Russo, supra note 5, % 2.08; Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The
Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445.
141. Hecht, 283 F. Supp. at 428.
142. Id. at 429-31.
143. Id. at 436 (defendant Wilder); id. at 439 (defendant Harris, Upham & Co.).
144. Id. at 433-35.
145. 430 F.2d at 1209-10.
146. 283 F. Supp. at 432. The court stated:
Where a customer so relies upon the recommendations of the broker that the broker is in a
position to control the volume and frequency of transactions and the broker, abusing the
confidence reposed in him, recommends and induces an excessive number of transac-
tions ... then there is a device, scheme or artifice to defraud ....
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at issue as whether the broker was in control of Mrs. Hecht's account. 147 It
then answered this question largely in terms of the extent to which Mrs.
Hecht followed the recommendations of her broker. The court stated:
Although control by the representative over the account is essential to a
finding of churning, such control need not amount to a formal vesting of
discretion in the representative. A degree of control sufficient to warrant
protection may be inferred from evidence that the customer invariably re-
lied on the dealer's recommendations, especially when the customer is rela-
tively naive and unsophisticated .... 148
So far as Wilder's control over the account is concerned, there can be no
doubt that (except in two or three instances where plaintiff had read or
heard something about some company... ) the volume and frequency of
the security trading was left to Wilder. Plaintiff did not insist upon trading
in any particular volume or with any particular frequency. On the con-
trary, Wilder made the recommendations in these matters and she invaria-
bly followed them.149
By focusing on the frequency with which a customer accepts the recom-
mendations of his broker, the district court emphasized probably the most
frequently cited factor in early SEC enforcement opinions supporting a find-
ing of reliance. 150 The Hecht decision could be interpreted, however, as ele-
vating this factor to the status of an independent determinant, divorced from
the underlying question of the customer's reliance.
This is perhaps best illustrated by another case in which the Ninth Circuit
addressed the question of churning. In Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 151
plaintiff was a thirty-eight-year-old supervisory engineer for McDonnell-
Douglas Corporation with both a bachelor of science and a master's degree
in engineering. At the time he opened his account with Dean Witter, he had
$30,000 in savings, $16,000 in an employee savings account with McDonnell-
Douglas, $15,000 of equity in his home, and holdings in McDonnell-Douglas
stock purchased through an employee payroll deduction plan. Prior to open-
ing his account with Dean Witter, Mihara traded in securities through sev-
eral other firms for approximately ten years. He deposited $30,000 with
Dean Witter to be invested in accordance with the recommendations of his
account executive but subject to his approval.152
147. Id. at 432-33.
148. Id. at 433 (citation omitted).
149. Id. at 435.
150. See, for example, In re E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 353-54, 382 (1942) (dis-
cussed supra text accompanying notes 97-116); see also supra notes 118-19 (cases discussing factors
necessary for a finding of reliance).
151. 619 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1980).
152. Id. at 817.
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Over a period of two years, Mihara experienced a substantial loss in equity
based on heavy trading in speculative stock, including extensive margin trad-
ing.153 At the end of that time, he filed suitability and churning claims
against Dean Witter and his account executive under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5. 154
Mihara testified that he lacked a finance and economics background. He
stated that at the time he opened his account with Dean Witter, he was con-
cerned about possible cutbacks in personnel at McDonnell-Douglas and
wanted to provide educational and financial security for his two daughters. 155
The broker's recollection of the plaintiff's investment objectives differed sub-
stantially. The broker testified that Mihara was not concerned about a layoff,
that he was interested primarily in growth, and that he was knowledgeable
about margin accounts and broker call rates.1 56 The defense called a broker
from one of the firms through which Mihara had previously traded to cor-
roborate this testimony. The broker from the other firm also testified that
Mihara was interested in growth stocks, that he had discussed but had not
opened a margin account, and that he had a good knowledge of the stock
market. 157
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the validity of a jury instruction patterned after
the district court decision in Hecht and upheld a verdict in favor of plain-
tiff.158 In a cursory discussion, the court simply noted that the requisite de-
gree of control is present when the client routinely follows his broker's
recommendations. 159
Hecht involved a plaintiff who was at least arguably more sophisticated
than the clients involved in the SEC enforcement cases. Mrs. Hecht's prior
market experience, her regular review of confirmation slips over a period of
seven years, and her receipt of outside accounting advice in connection with
preparation of tax returns that reflected changes in her portfolio, distinguish
her somewhat from the totally naive and dependent customers duped by
their brokers in the early SEC disciplinary proceedings.160 Ultimately, how-
ever, the Hecht court found the plaintiff's knowledge of the market superfi-
153. Id. at 817-18.
154. Id. at 816-17.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 820.
158. Id. at 820, 824-25.
159. Id. at 821.
160. Compare the portrait of Mrs. Hecht that emerges in Hecht, supra text accompanying notes
131-38, with the profiles of the customers in In re RH. Johnson, 36 S.E.C. 467 (1955), aff'd per
curiam, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956), discussed supra note 120 and




cial. 16 1 Moreover, the court placed considerable import on the defendant-
broker's actions in removing account information from her home and prepar-
ing misleading account summaries. 162 Whatever one might conclude as to
the propriety of the findings in Hecht, the background of the plaintiff in
Mihara presents a much murkier case with respect to control. Under the
Hecht standard, however, the mere fact that Mihara accepted his broker's
recommendations was sufficient to carry the day for Mihara.
Focusing solely on the frequency with which a customer follows his bro-
ker's recommendations could lead to anomalous results. A sophisticated or
active customer, involved in the management of his account, could attempt
to disclaim control by establishing that he generally agreed with his broker's
recommendations. Subsequent judicial opinions naturally reject this re-
sult.163 In an effort to obviate the dilemma posed by literal adherence to
Hecht, they offer a variety of alternative tests for determining whether the
broker or the customer controlled the account. However, they continue the
trend begun in Hecht of attempting specific formulations that focus on one or
more factors as dispositive of the issue of control. This trend somewhat loses
sight of the fact that these factors assume significance only to the extent that
they bear on the ultimate question of customer reliance and the broker's role
in inducing that reliance.
For example, the Fourth Circuit. addressed the question of de facto control
in Carras v. Burns.164 In Carras, a customer died leaving a margin account
with Merrill Lynch as the principal asset in his estate. The customer had
been an active investor who traded in growth stocks on a highly leveraged
basis. The customer named a son and daughter as executors of his estate.
The daughter had little knowledge of the stock market, but the son had expe-
rience in the restaurant and real estate business and had maintained a margin
account in his own name with Merrill Lynch for ten years. He followed
stock prices in general and tracked his own account in particular. While
executor of his father's estate, the son also continued trading in his own ac-
count, sometimes buying stocks that were later purchased by the estate.165
After the estate suffered substantial losses, the executors sued Merrill Lynch
and the account executive, alleging among other things tha. the defendants
churned the estate's account. 166 The executors disparaged their own experi-
ence and knowledge of the market. The defendants, on the other hand, in-
161. 283 F. Supp. at 433.
162. Id. at 434.
163. See Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 3 (Ist Cir. 1983) (following bro-
ker's recommendations not dispositive as to control); Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d
673, 676-78 (9th Cir. 1982) (same).
164. 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975).
165. Id. at 254.
166. Id. at 253.
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sisted that the son was fully competent to manage the account and had made
the investment decisions.167
The trial court instructed the jury to determine first whether the executors
lacked the intelligence, knowledge, and experience necessary to manage the
account.1 68 If the jury answered this question in the affirmative, it was then
to determine whether the executors gave the broker control over the ac-
count.169 The jury answered the first question in the negative, finding that
the executors did not lack competence to manage the account. The Fourth
Circuit indicated that this finding would ordinarily dispose of the churning
claim.170
However, because the case was remanded for a new trial due to other er-
rors, the Fourth Circuit proceeded to examine the trial court's two-step in-
struction on control. 17 1 The court found it defective, noting that the
structure of the instruction erroneously suggested that liability for churning
can only be imposed when a customer who lacks the competence to manage
an account expressly gives the broker sole authority and control over the
account. 72 The court stated that the instruction should instead be phrased
so that lack of customer competence may in itself suggest control by the
broker.173 The court remarked:
Control of trading is an essential element of churning. In the absence of an
express agreement, control may be inferred from the broker-customer rela-
tionship when the customer lacks the ability to manage the account and
must take the broker's word for what is happening. However, a customer
retains control of his account if he has sufficient financial acumen to deter-
mine his own best interests and he acquiesces in the broker's management.
The issue is whether or not the customer, based on the information avail-
able to him and his ability to interpret it, can independently evaluate his
broker's suggestions. Contrary to the phrasing of the questions in the spe-
cial verdict, the executors did not have to prove both that they lacked the
competence to manage the account and also that they gave control to
Burns. Lack of competence itself may give rise to an inference of
control. 174
The Ninth Circuit had occasion to revisit the question of control in
Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co. 175 Merrill Follansbee had a bachelor of
167. Id. at 258.
168. Id. at 257.
169. Id. at 257-58.
170. Id. at 258.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 259.
174. Id. at 258-59 (citations omitted).
175. 681 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1982).
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arts degree in economics and a divinity degree. He became an ordained Pres-
byterian minister and, after some early pastorates, assumed a position as ad-
ministrator of education programs for the United Presbyterian Church.
Follansbee inherited a substantial block of stock from his father. After trad-
ing for a year with Dean Witter, he read and was impressed by a book enti-
tled Stock Market Blueprints. He subsequently switched his account to
Chester Bjerke at Merrill Lynch because Bjerke had helped write the book.
Follansbee indicated that he wanted his account handled more actively than
it had been handled at Dean Witter. 176 Follansbee initially prospered with
Bjerke and touted him highly. 177 When Bjerke left Merrill Lynch to join
Davis, Skaggs & Co., Follansbee transferred his account to Davis, Skaggs
and shortly thereafter agreed to an even more aggressive strategy in his port-
folio. He frequently attended weekly investment seminars conducted by
Bjerke, kept meticulous records of his purchases and sales, read reports from
various financial services, and from time to time made suggestions to Bjerke
about further investigation of potential investment prospects. 178
Following substantial losses in his account, Follansbee sued Bjerke after
six years of trading, also naming Davis, Skaggs & Co. as a defendant. 179 Fol-
lansbee alleged both suitability violations and churning.' 0 The trial court
denied the suitability claims but granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff
with respect to the churning charge. 18 Reversing the churning award,'8 2 the
Ninth Circuit held that the amount of trading in Follansbee's account was
not excessive in light of his aggressive investment goals and further held that
the evidence did not support a finding that the broker controlled the
account.18 3
Although the Ninth Circuit cited Hecht and Mihara as stating the applica-
ble standard of control, the panel apparently recognized the difficulties inher-
ent in a literal application of the two prior decisions. 8 4 The court
characterized the emphasis in Mihara on the frequency with which a cus-
tomer follows the broker's recommendations as a "shorthand means of ex-
176. Id. at 674.
177. Id. at 674-75.
178. Id. at 675.
179. Id. at 674, 676.
180. Id. at 674.
181. Id. The decision of the district court is unreported but is mentioned in the Ninth Circuit's
Opinion. Id. at 674, 678.
182. Id. at 678.
183. Id. at 676-77.
184. Id. at 676-77. See supra notes 13 1-50 and accompanying text (discussing Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified in part and aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th
Cir. 1970)); supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text (discussing Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co.,
619 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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pressing a more complicated concept."' 18 5 It indicated that neither decision
intended to suggest that a nonprofessional investor who usually follows his
broker's advice cannot be found in control of his account. The court can-
didly acknowledged that a customer can usually be expected to accept the
recommendations of his broker, or he is likely to begin shopping for a new
broker in whom he has more confidence. 18 6
Quoting favorably from Carras v. Burns, '8 7 the Ninth Circuit framed the
real question as whether the customer is able to evaluate independently the
recommendations of the broker.'8 8 In this regard, the court noted:
The touchstone is whether or not the customer has sufficient intelligence
and understanding to evaluate the broker's recommendations and to reject
one when he thinks it unsuitable .... As long as the customer has the
capacity to exercise the final right to say "yes" or "no", the customer con-
trols the account. 189
Carras and Follansbee represent a marked improvement over the almost
exclusive focus in Hecht and Mihara on the degree to which a customer ac-
cepts his broker's recommendations. 190 Follansbee in particular attempts to
correct the incongruous result that literal adherence to the Hecht standard
can produce in the case of a sophisticated or active customer who, although
involved in management of his account, generally agrees with his broker.
Both Carras and Follansbee, however, still fall somewhat short of fully cap-
turing the fundamental issue of reliance.
Carras and Follansbee essentially substitute customer sophistication as the
key issue with respect to control in place of the focus in Hecht and Mihara on
the frequency with which the customer follows the recommendations of his
broker. Like general acceptance of a broker's advice, a lack of sophistication
on the part of the customer is one factor that frequently recurs in many of
the early SEC enforcement proceedings.' 91 As those cases demonstrate,
however, it is a factor that must be examined within the larger framework of
reliance. For example, a relatively unsophisticated customer could be suffi-
ciently active with his account to be found in control.' 92
185. Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 677.
186. Id.
187. 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975).
188. 681 F.2d at 677.
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 131-50 and accompanying text (discussing Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,
283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified in part and aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970)); supra
text accompanying notes 151-59 (discussing Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.
1980)).
191. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (describing characteristics of victims of churning
activity in early cases).
192. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, both Carras and Follansbee focus on only half of the equation-
the customer. In articulating a standard for de facto control that emphasizes
the financial acumen of the customer, neither decision mentions the conduct
of the broker in actively inducing the customer's dependency. This may be
attributable to the jury's rejection in Carras of the executors' contention that
they lacked the intelligence to manage the account, and the Ninth Circuit's
similar rejection of Mr. Follansbee's claim. Thus, neither case ever reached
the question of the broker's conduct. The broker's role in inducing customer
reliance, however, is a key factor in the early SEC disciplinary proceedings,
as well as in Hecht, and it should not be ignored. 193
A number of other circuits have also tackled the question of what consti-
tutes de facto control. In Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman Co. Commodities, 194
the Eighth Circuit upheld a jury verdict in favor of a cattle rancher who
alleged unauthorized trading and churning of his commodities account. 195
On the control issue, the court noted that the customer followed most of the
broker's recommendations, that the customer lacked experience in commodi-
ties trading, and that the customer had difficulty understanding the transac-
tions in question even when the broker tried to explain them.1 96
In Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 197 the First Circuit endorsed a
detailed instruction on control that advised the jury to consider whether the
customer or the broker initiated trading in the account, whether the cus-
tomer ever purchased stock not recommended by the broker, whether the
customer acted on his own or with the advice of another investment service,
and whether the customer ever rejected recommendations from the bro-
193. For example, in Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modi-
fied in part and aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970), the district court noted, among other things,
(1) that the broker cultivated both a business and social relationship with Mrs. Hecht, befriending
her at the time of her husband's death, 283 F. Supp. at 424; (2) that he visited her home at least
once per week, id. at 426; (3) that during these visits he reviewed her confirmation slips with her
and then removed the slips to his home, even though he had duplicates at his office, id. at 426; and
(4) that he prepared account summaries designed to suggest gain and allay fears of excessive trad-
ing, id. at 434. Thus, the court premised its finding with respect to control not solely on Mrs.
Hecht's shortcomings with respect to market sophistication, but also on the broker's conduct in
fostering her dependency.
If courts focus only on the customer's financial acumen and ignore the issue of whether the
broker actively induced customer reliance, the control portion of a churning claim begins to merge
with the notion of suitability. Although claims of suitability violations under rule lOb-5 frequently
accompany a charge of churning in securities cases, the two doctrines have traditionally been theo-
retically distinct. See supra note 140 (discussing suitability doctrine). The CFTC has consistently
declined to read a suitability requirement into § 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act. See Phacelli
v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,250, at
32,674 (CFTC Sept. 5, 1986).
194. 688 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982).
195. Id. at 1196, 1205.
196. Id. at 1203.
197. 719 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
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ker.198 In addition, the trial court instructed the jury to consider the cus-
tomer's general business acumen, his investment background, and his
knowledge of the broker's investment activities. 199 The First Circuit rejected
the customer's claim that the trial court committed reversible error when it
refused to supplement this instruction with an instruction patterned after the
holding in Hecht.2°° Affirming a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, the
court stated that routinely following a broker's recommendations, though an
important consideration, is not by itself determinative in deciding the ques-
tion of control. 201 Alluding to the problems presented by a literal application
of Hecht and Mihara, the court noted that to hold otherwise would prevent
imputing control to a sophisticated investor who actively monitors his ac-
count, but who does not generally disagree with his broker.202 The court
stated that considerations of the investor's sophistication and ability to inde-
pendently evaluate the handling of his account are at least as important as
the frequency with which a customer follows his broker's advice.20 3 The
court felt that the trial court's instruction adequately encompassed the latter
without putting undue emphasis on it.2°4
Most recently, in Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.,205 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a jury award for churning of an options
account in favor of a college-educated customer in a middle-management
position who had prior experience in options trading.20 6 At the time the
customer opened the options account in question, he signed an account
agreement that included a risk disclosure statement. The plaintiff denied,
however, that the broker ever discussed the risks of options trading with
him.20 7 The plaintiff admitted that he was aware of the volume of trading in
his account, that he had received confirmation slips, and that he had re-
mained in frequent contact with the broker during the approximately two
years the account was open.208
Characterizing the case as a classic jury trial with conflicting testimony,
198. Id. at 3.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 3-4
201. Id. at 3.
202. Id. at 3 & n.2.
203. Id. at 3.
204. Id. at 4.
205. 767 F.2d 1498 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
206. Id. at 1500. Mr. Arceneaux graduated from Louisiana State University in 1954 with a
degree in mechanical engineering. Beginning in 1970, he was employed by Walter Kidde & Co. as a
regional sales manager. He opened an options account with the Dallas office of Merrill Lynch in
1977 and opened another account when he moved to Mobile, Alabama. In 1980, Arceneaux moved
to Clearwater, Florida, and opened the account in question. Id.
207. Id. at 1500-01.
208. Id. at 1501.
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the court found sufficient evidence to support the finding of control by the
broker. 20 9 The defendants contended that Arceneaux was a well educated
and experienced options trader with sufficient financial acumen to determine
his own best interests.210 Affirming the jury's verdict in favor of Arceneaux,
the Eleventh Circuit simply stated in a cursory fashion that although the
plaintiff apparently discussed his account frequently with the broker, the jury
could have concluded from his testimony that he was somewhat intimidated
by the broker and that he was reluctant to make any suggestions or to con-
tradict any suggestions from the broker.211
C. CFTC INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL
The CFTC has been a relatively recent participant in the development of
the concept of control in churning cases. 212 Although the CFTC makes
some distinctions with respect to measuring the excessive trading portion of a
churning claim, it regards proof of the control element in commodities cases
as analytically identical to securities cases.213 The CFTC thus has formu-
lated its definition of de facto control largely within the framework of ex-
isting securities law precedent.
In Smith v. Siegel Trading Co.,214 the first reparations proceeding involv-
ing churning that the CFTC accepted for review,215 a customer filed a pro se
complaint against his broker alleging unauthorized trading.216 At the initial
hearing the administrative law judge rejected the customer's unauthorized
trading claim, concluding that the customer had acquiesced in the challenged
transactions. 217 The administrative law judge, however, proceeded to find
that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported a charge of churning,
even though the customer had not alleged churning in his complaint. In
ruling favorably for the customer on this ground, the administrative law
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1502.
211. Id.
212. The CFTC was created under the Commodities Future Trading Commission Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982 & Supp. III
1985)). Prior to creation of the CFTC as an independent federal regulatory agency, regulatory
authority over futures trading rested primarily with the Department of Agriculture. For a brief
history of commodities futures regulation, see 2 P. JOHNSON, supra note 35, §§ 4.01-.02; Lowe,
supra note 2, at 327-28.
213. See Smith v. Siegel Trading Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,105, at 24,453-54 & nn.4-5 (CFTC Sept. 3, 1980) (noting that dissimilarities between securities
and commodities markets affect proof of excessive trading element of churning claim, but framing
definition of control by citing existing securities law); see also supra notes 54-56 and accompanying
text (discussing similarities and dissimilarities between securities and commodity churning cases).
214. [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,105 (CFTC Sept. 3, 1980).
215. Id. at 24,453.
216. Id. at 24,451.
217. Id. at 24,451-52.
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judge relied on the standard for de facto control articulated in Hecht.218
On review, the CFTC reversed the initial decision of the administrative
law judge with respect to churning.219 The Commission noted that even
though the churning charge had not been pleaded, it could have been tried
with the express or implied consent of the parties.220 The CFTC found, how-
ever, that the respondents had not consented to trial on the churning claim
and had not been accorded a full and fair hearing on this issue.22' It re-
manded the case for further evidentiary findings, stating that the initial hear-
ing failed to develop adequately both the excessive trading and the control
elements of the case.222
In ordering a new hearing on the churning claim, the Commission drew on
existing securities law precedent to identify six factors probative of de facto
control in a nondiscretionary commodities account. In this regard the Com-
mission stated:
The element of control, which involves an inquiry entirely apart from the
element of excessive trading, must, of course, also be proven before churn-
ing may be found. In general, '[s]uch a finding of control is not dependent
on the account being formally labeled discretionary but is based rather on
who in fact was making the decisions.' Of course, whether such control
exists is a question of fact which can only be decided based upon the partic-
ular circumstances present in each case .... There are, however, certain
generally recognized factors which the trier of fact should consider in de-
termining whether control has been proven. Among the factors which tend
to demonstrate control are 1) a lack of customer sophistication 2) a lack of
prior commodity trading experience on the part of the customer and a min-
imum of time devoted by him to his account 3) a high degree of trust and
confidence reposed in the associated person by the customer 4) a large per-
centage of transactions entered into by the customer based upon the recom-
mendations of the associated person 5) the absence of prior customer
approval for transactions entered into on his behalf 6) customer approval
of recommended transactions where the approval is not based upon full,
truthful and accurate information supplied by the associated person.223
The CFTC indicated that the factors listed are not intended to be exhaus-
tive on the question of control.224 It characterized the list as setting forth
certain well recognized criteria that at a minimum should be considered in
determining this issue.225 The Commission emphasized that each factor need
218. Id. at 24,452.
219. Id. at 24,455.
220. Id. at 24,455-56.
221. Id. at 24,456.
222. Id. at 24,455.
223. Id. at 24,454 (citations omitted).
224. Id. at 24,454 n.6.
225. Id.
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not be present in every case and stated that the probative value of any single
factor will depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.2 26
Finally, it cautioned administrative law judges to identify the criteria utilized
in arriving at a finding of control and to articulate the analytical reasoning
behind an ultimate finding of churning.227
The factors identified by the CFTC in Smith represent a compilation of
various factual criteria frequently cited by appellate and district court opin-
ions in the securities law area to substantiate a finding of de facto control.
The failure to tackle the problem of relative probative weight, however, has
resulted in a state of disarray in commodities reparations proceedings similar
to that found in the securities law area.
Commodities reparations opinions frame the control inquiry in terms of
whether the customer or the broker is responsible for the level of trading in
the customer's account.228 They then answer this question with a conclusory
reference to the list of factors in Smith.229 With little or no further analysis,
they pick and choose among these criteria and find the presence or absence of
the particular factor or factors chosen as dispositive in the case at hand.2 30
226. Id.
227. Id. at 24,455 n.8.
228. See DeAngelis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,753, at 31,137 (CFTC Sept. 30, 1985) (essential question is whether broker
and not customer is responsible for level of trading); Lehman v. Madda Trading Co., [1984-1986
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) % 22,417, at 29,866 (CFIC Nov. 13, 1984) (discussing
importance of who controls level of trading).
229. See DeAngelis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) % 22,753, at 31,137 (CFTC Sept. 30, 1985) (factors in Smith tend to demon-
strate existence of de facto control); Lehman v. Madda Trading Co., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) % 22,417, at 29,866 (CFTC Nov. 13, 1984) (same); Ball v. Shearson
Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,184, at 24,874
(CFTC Apr. 2, 1981) (discussing factors of control in Smith).
230. See DeAngelis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) t 22,753, at 31,138 (CFTC Sept. 30, 1985) (reversed finding of administrative
law judge that customer was in control of accounts during opening months of trading prior to
express grant of discretionary authority to broker; notwithstanding evidence that customer some-
times ordered entry of additional positions in contracts originally recommended by broker, cus-
tomer's lack of sophistication, coupled with volume and variety of trading, suggest control by
broker); Piskur v. International Precious Metals Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 122,493, at 30,186 (CFTC Jan. 2, 1985) (affirmed finding of administrative law judge
that broker was in de facto control of account of unsophisticated customer who invariably followed
broker's recommendations); Lehman v. Madda Trading Co., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,417, at 29,867 (CFTC Nov. 13, 1984) (affirmed finding of administrative
law judge that broker exercised de facto control over account of two brothers, self-employed televi-
sion repairman, and local businessman; although customers had some prior commodities trading
experience, CFTC found broker in control where customers relied completely on advice of broker,
never instructed broker to enter positions against broker's advice, and invariably acquiesced in
trades made by broker without advance authorization); Ball v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-
1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,184, at 24,874-75 (CFTC Apr. 2, 1981)
(sustained finding of administrative law judge that customer who was experienced commodities
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They offer little rationale, however, for why one factor as opposed to any
other is selected for attention and found to be controlling in a given case.
Moreover, like the securities opinions, the reparations decisions tend to ex-
amine the factor chosen for scrutiny in isolation from the underlying frame-
work of relational reliance that provides the necessary context. 231
IV. PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY EXISTING INTERPRETATIONS OF DE
FACTO CONTROL
The proliferation of different formulas for determining control in the case
of a nondiscretionary account, coupled with the variety of procedural con-
texts in which this question may arise, has led to a good deal of confusion
and uncertainty in the case law. Trial courts, faced with a plethora of stan-
dards on de facto control, frequently find themselves reversed because an
appellate court either favors a slightly different formulation of the concept of
control or opts to construe the standard chosen by the trial court as not
applicable in a procedural context different from that in which it was origi-
nally framed.
trader was in 6ontrol of own account; customer's capability to exercise independent trading judg-
ment evidenced by rejection of several proposed trades; customer registered no complaint in re-
sponse to letter and telephone calls from branch manager apprising him of commission charges).
231. The churning cases reviewed by the CFTC have frequently involved customers who might
be characterized as polar unsophisticates in terms of employment and educational background. See
Piskur v. International Precious Metals Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 22,493, at 30,185-86 (CFTC Jan. 2, 1985) (customer was 69-year-old retiree without prior
trading experience in commodities or precious metals, whose formal education was limited to grade
school; employment history included variety of blue-collar occupations and 10 years as owner/
operator of flower shop).
Although the opinions frequently list the multiple criteria articulated in Smith, the cases often
turn almost solely on the degree of customer sophistication. In this sense, the approach in the
reparations opinions resembles that of the Fourth Circuit in Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir.
1975) (discussed supra at notes 164-74 and accompanying text). See Lehman v. Madda Trading
Co., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,417, at 29,867 (CFTC Nov. 13,
1984) (citing Carras with approval). A focus on customer sophistication alone, however, removed
from the larger framework of reliance and divorced from consideration of the broker's conduct in
fostering customer dependency, presents some difficulties. See supra notes 191-93 and accompany-
ing text criticizing this aspect of Carras.
There is one Commission decision which does a better job of capturing the relational reliance
interest at stake in the control portion of a churning claim. See Gatens v. International Precious
Metals Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,636, at 30,706 (CFTC
June 18, 1985). In Gatens, the CFTC was presented with another case involving customers whose
backgrounds suggested a low level of sophistication. William Gatens was employed as a laborer
and blast furnace operator. His wife had been employed as a shirt presser and cleaning woman.
Both were high school graduates with no prior experience in trading commodities or leveraged
contracts. Their annual income was approximately $26,000. Id. at 30,704. Although placing a good
deal of emphasis on the customer's lack of sophistication, the opinion examined this factor within
the context of the more important question of reliance. It discussed the interrelationship between
the customers' background and the dependency that they developed on their broker and mentioned
the broker's actions in fostering this dependency. Id. at 30,706-07.
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The recent opinion of the Third Circuit in Bowley v. Stotler & Co. 232 pro-
vides an excellent illustration. In Bowley, the customer opted to bring a
claim for churning of a nondiscretionary commodities account in federal dis-
trict court as an implied cause of action under section 4(b) of the Commodi-
ties Exchange Act, rather than as a reparations proceeding before the
CFTC.233 At trial, the customer requested an instruction on control that
tracked the compilation of factors suggested by the CFTC in Smith v. Siegel
Trading Co.234 The district court declined the plaintiff's requested instruc-
tion.235 Instead, it gave an instruction that focused on whether the customer
or the broker had the right to refuse to trade and the willingness to exercise
that right if the customer's objectives would not be fulfilled.236 The trial
court's instruction was partially erroneous since a broker generally cannot
refuse to execute a trade in a nondiscretionary account. 237 The balance of
the instruction, however, focusing on the customer's right and ability to re-
fuse to trade, was directly in line with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Follans-
bee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co.238 Nonetheless, the Third Circuit ruled that the
trial court's instruction constituted reversible error.239
In remanding the case for a new trial, the Third Circuit stated that quite
apart from the defective part of the charge, the instruction was deficient in
omitting specific reference to the factors that the CFTC regards as relevant
to the issue of control.240 The court rejected the broker's reliance on Follans-
bee as support for the charge.241 The Third Circuit distinguished Follansbee
from the case at bar by noting that the former case involved a trial court's
decision that was reversed for clearly erroneous findings of fact in favor of
the customer on the issue of control, whereas the latter involved the ade-
quacy of a jury instruction under circumstances in which the evidence on
control had been found sufficient to submit to a jury.242
Bowley exemplifies the mixed signals exchanged between appellate and
232. 751 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1985).
233. Id. at 643 & n.1.
234. [1980-82 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,105, at 24,454 (CFTC Sept. 3,
1980).
235. Id. at 645. The broker prevailed in the district court. Id. at 643.
236. Id. at 645.
237. Id. at 645, 648.
238. 681 F.2d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1982).
239. 751 F.2d at 649.
240. Id. at 648.
241. Id.
242. Id. The Third Circuit also felt that the plaintiff's requested instruction was consistent with
the standard for control articulated in Follansbee. Id. at 648-49.
For another example of a situation in which a court pointed to differences in procedural context
in distinguishing a case with respect to the control issue, see Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon &
Co., 719 F.2d 1, 3 n.2 (lst Cir. 1983) (in affirming trial court's instruction on control, court notes
that plaintiff's claim to entitlement of an instruction based on Mihara is misguided; standard for
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trial courts as a result of the present disparity in standards on de facto con-
trol. This kind of confusion in the case law, however, is only one of the
problems created by existing interpretations of control. Far more trouble-
some is the tendency under present standards to pigeonhole every case into
one polar extreme or the other with respect to the control question.
Admittedly, some cases lend themselves to black and white characteriza-
tions with respect to control. They generally involve customers who can eas-
ily be classified in terms of their ability or inability to fend for themselves.
For example, in Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine,243 the court had no diffi-
culty finding that a broker controlled the account of a housewife with a high
school education who differentiated stocks from bonds on the basis that
"stocks have names and bonds don't."' 244 At the other end of the spectrum,
but equally as clear, are decisions such as M & B Contracting Corp. v.
Dale, 245 in which the court rejected a corporate customer's claim of de facto
control by the broker where the company's account was closely monitored by
its own vice president of finance.246 The vice president, a certified public
accountant with extensive business experience, maintained close contact with
the broker and individually evaluated each trading recommendation. 247
Far more often, however, the cases present mixed control situations in
which the plaintiff is neither a naive unsophisticated customer completely
control articulated in Mihara must be read within context of fact that court was only considering
whether there was sufficient evidence to support jury finding of control).
243. 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
244. Id. at 838; see Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 206 (D. Mass.
1978) (plaintiff was young, single, elementary school teacher who shortly after arriving in Boston
deposited all $18,000 of her assets with defendant broker, whom she began dating; plaintiff did not
know meaning of basic stock trading terms and relied completely upon defendant, who guaranteed
he would reimburse her for any losses and became angry anytime she questioned him regarding the
account); Gatens v. International Precious Metals Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,636, at 30,706-07 (CFTC June 18, 1985) (plaintiffs were unsophisticated high
school graduates who placed great trust in broker); Piskur v. International Precious Metals Corp.,
[1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,493, at 30,189 (CFTC Jan. 2, 1985)
(noting plaintiff's lack of education and experience).
245. 795 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1986).
246. Id. at 535.
247. Id.; see Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 677-78 (9th Cir. 1982) (customer
with economics degree who meticulously followed investments held in control of his account);
Xaphes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 471, 484 (D. Me. 1986)
(customer who was lawyer and former city treasurer held in control of options account; customer
monitored account constantly and was in frequent contact with broker, who explained and dis-
cussed all trades prior to execution); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 461 F. Supp.
951, 956 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (customer who was accountant and tax consultant with prior trading
experience and who understood mechanics of market, maintained frequent contact with broker, and
understood account statements held in control of securities account); Home v. Francis I. duPont &
Co., 428 F. Supp. 1271, 1274-75 (D.D.C. 1977) (customer who was corporate executive in charge of
company health and pension plans and who was intimately familiar with mathematical trading
system used in his account held in control of securities account).
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detached from operation of his account, nor a savvy market-wise investor
responsible for all of his own trading decisions. Such cases involve customers
who are not as naive or passive as they seek to establish in courts, or as
sophisticated or active as their brokers seek to portray them. As more can-
did courts have acknowledged, the truth probably lies somewhere in the mid-
dle.248 The existing standards of de facto control, however, make no
provision for a finding of mixed control. The result is that the decisions are
difficult to reconcile.
For example, in the Hecht case discussed previously, 249 the district court
admitted that Mrs. Hecht was neither as ignorant with respect to brokerage
accounts as she sought to appear, nor as informed as the defendants painted
her.250 While finding her knowledge and experience sufficient to estop her
suitability claims, the court nonetheless held that the broker controlled her
account for purposes of sustaining the churning charge.251 The court ulti-
mately concluded that her seeming familiarity with the market was more
bravado than actual knowledge. 252
On the other hand, in Shorrock v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.,253 a twenty-one-year-old college student deposited with Merrill Lynch
$50,000 worth of securities that she received upon termination of a minority
guardianship set up by her deceased father.254 Based on discussions held at
the time she opened her account, the account executive marked boxes on the
firm's customer information forms indicating that plaintiff's investment
objectives were relative safety of principal, growth, and good quality invest-
ments.255 In the eighteen months that followed, the account engaged in a
high volume of margin trading in speculative securities.256 The account ex-
ecutive made recommendations to the plaintiff that she accepted in virtually
every case.257 Many of the trades with the plaintiff were executed by the firm
as principal for its own account. 25 8 The account executive did furnish the
248. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 325 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (where
customer claimed to be unsophisticated investor and broker claimed customer desired aggressive
trading, court stated "probable that the truth lay somewhere in between the two conflicting sto-
ries"); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 429 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (customer neither as
naive as she claimed nor as sophisticated as broker claimed), modified in part and aff'd, 430 F.2d
1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
249. 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified in part and aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
1970).
250. 283 F. Supp. at 429.
251. Id. at 429-31 (suitability); id. at 433-34 (churning).
252. Id. at 433.
253. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,251 (D. Or. Nov. 18, 1977).
254. Id. at 92,676.
255. Id. at 92,674.
256. Id. at 92,675-76.
257. Id. at 92,675.
258. Id.
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plaintiff with a booklet about margin trading and enclosed research reports
with her confirmation slips.2 59 Plaintiff ultimately lost two-thirds of her
opening balance.2 60
In what it characterized as a difficult case, the court held that Ms. Shor-
rock was in control of her account.261 The court determined that the plaintiff
had some business experience, albeit limited, by virtue of her part-time em-
ployment, maintenance of a checking account, and experience in traveling to
Europe.262 Although the court acknowledged that the plaintiff was some-
what unsophisticated in the management of her personal financial affairs, it
nevertheless found her intelligence, education, and judgment sufficient to
amount to control of her account.2 63
The obvious counterpoint between the findings in Hecht and Shorrock il-
lustrates the dilemma posed by existing interpretations of de facto control.
Increasingly the cases involve difficult mixed control situations in which the
facts do not fall neatly at one end of the spectrum or the other with respect to
the control issue; yet the existing standards for determining control require
exactly this kind of categorization.
More and more frequently, the portrait of the plaintiff that emerges in
churning cases is that of a moderately successful, college-educated customer
with middle-management business experience and some prior trading his-
tory, who is not totally inactive in monitoring his account. This was the
nature of the plaintiffs in Mihara and Arceneaux, who successfully main-
tained claims of de facto control by the broker.264 A similarly situated cus-
tomer in Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. 265 did not fare as
well. The trial court acknowledged that the plaintiff did not fully compre-
hend the risks involved in some of the sophisticated stock and options trans-
actions recommended to him by his young and inexperienced broker,266 but
259. Id. at 92,675-76.
260. Id. at 92,675.
261. Id. at 92,679.
262. Id. at 92,674.
263. Id. at 92,674, 92,676.
264. See Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1980) (customer was 38-year-
old engineer with 10 years of investment experience); Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1985) (customer was regional sales manager with three years
of investment experience).
265. 539 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd, 709 F.2d 1413 (11th Cir. 1983). The plaintiff in
Thompson was a salaried middle-management employee of a paper company, who also ran a part-
time sales business of his own. At one time he had run for mayor of Atlanta. He had some limited
experience with stock market transactions and had also invested in speculative real estate. He met
the defendant broker, who had been out of college only two years, at the swimming pool in the
apartment complex where they both lived. 539 F. Supp. at 860.
266. 539 F. Supp. at 863. Originally Thompson opened a cash account with the broker to trade
securities and entered his own orders. As rapport between the two men grew, however, the broker
made suggestions, and Thompson became more confident of his judgment. Id. at 860. After three
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the court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff was an experienced business-
man, generally able to recognize and capitalize on investment opportunities,
who was "playing the market." 267
The cases discussed above clearly demonstrate that current standards for
testing control force an all-or-nothing decision with respect to the very
threshold issue in a churning case on facts that frequently defy such classifi-
cation. Faced with this problem, churning decisions exhibit a few pro-
nounced tendencies. First, although the decisions pay lip service to the
proposition that the customer must prove the element of control as part of
his prima facie case, the tenor of the opinions suggests that many courts
begin with a subtle predisposition in favor of the customer on this issue. In
part this may be attributable to the fiduciary overtones normally equated
with the role of a broker.268 However, when a customer opts to open a non-
discretionary account, by definition he purports to retain legal control over
the account. 269 Courts have long recognized that the fiduciary duties owed
by a broker with respect to a nondiscretionary account are significantly nar-
rower than the duties owed in the case of a discretionary account. 270
months of trading, Thompson converted to a margin account at the suggestion of the broker. Id. at
860-61.
At about this same time, Thompson signed an options account agreement. Although he and his
broker had never specifically discussed opening an options account, the court found that they had
mutually decided to seek more aggresive investments for Thompson. Thompson did not read the
options account agreement prior to execution. The agreement contained boilerplate language ac-
knowledging his suitability for options trading and acknowledging receipt of an Options Clearing
Corporation prospectus. In fact, Thompson did not receive a prospectus. Moreover, the broker
filled out the account information sheet with salary and net worth figures for Thompson which he
did not obtain from Thompson, but which he selected simply to satisfy internal firm guidelines. Id.
at 861.
Thereafter, the broker took the initiative in recommending securities and options trades to
Thompson, and the securities trading became short-term in nature. Id. At the time the broker
recommended the initial option transaction, he did not advise Thompson that put options are an
unusually risky form of investment. Id. at 862. Moreover, the court found that Thompson did not
understand the nature of a put option. Id. The court further found, however, that the broker did
not realize Thompson's lack of comprehension. The court noted that the plaintiff's demeanor was
bold and assertive such that he was unlikely to admit his uncertainties. Id.
267. Id. at 860-61.
268. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
269. See Lehman v. Madda Trading Co., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 22,417, at 29,866 (CFTC Nov. 13, 1984) ("Unless a customer executes a power of attorney
or equivalent instrument granting another the authority to trade his account, the account is nondis-
cretionary and the customer retains the legal right to control the trading.").
The customer, of course, can seek to establish that notwithstanding the form of the account, the
broker maintained actual control. The customer, however, should bear the burden of overcoming
the presumption of legal control suggested by the form of his account.
270. See Hill v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 790 F.2d 817, 824 (10th Cir. 1986) (fiduciary
duty owed in nondiscretionary accounts is "very narrow-primarily not to make unauthorized
trades"); Caravan Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 769 F.2d 561,
567 (9th Cir. 1985) (agency relationship in nondiscretionary account terminates when transaction is
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Nevertheless, most de facto control decisions phrase their inquiry simply
in terms of whether the customer or the broker controlled the nondiscretion-
ary account, not in terms of whether the customer has proven that the broker
usurped the control that the form of the account suggests the customer re-
tained.271 Given the fiduciary overtones normally associated with the bro-
complete); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich.
1978) (broker handling discretionary account becomes fiduciary of customer in broad sense unlike
broker handling nondiscretionary account).
The Leib opinion articulates the difference in the scope of duties owed by a broker in a nondiscre-
tionary, as opposed to a discretionary, account. In a nondiscretionary account, the customer deter-
mines which purchases and sales to make. Thus, the broker owes only limited transactional duties,
which cease when a given transaction is closed. Id. at 952-53. According to the Lieb court, these
duties include: (1) a duty, if making a recommendation, to make an informed recommendation; (2)
a duty of prompt execution; (3) a duty to inform the customer of risks involved in purchasing or
selling a particular security; (4) a duty to refrain from self-dealing or failing to disclose any personal
interest the broker may have in a recommended security; (5) a duty not to misrepresent any fact
material to the transaction; and (6) a duty not to transact business without prior authorization from
the customer. Id. at 953. A broker in a nondiscretionary account owes no continuing duty to keep
abreast of financial information that may affect his customer's portfolio or to inform his customer of
developments that might influence his investments. Moreover, he has no duty to engage in any
particular course of trading. Id.
In contrast, a broker handling a discretionary account becomes the fiduciary of his customer in a
broad sense. Id. In particular, the broker of a discretionary account must: (1) manage the account
in a manner consistent with the needs and objectives of the customer; (2) keep informed of, and act
responsively to, market changes that affect the customer; (3) keep the customer informed as to each
completed transaction; and (4) explain forthrightly the practical effect and potential risks of the
course of dealing in which the broker is engaged. Id.
271. It is not surprising that after carefully differentiating the fiduciary relationships involved in
nondiscretionary versus discretionary accounts, the Lieb court is one of the few courts to phrase the
de facto control issue in terms of whether the broker usurped control from the customer.
Following its discussion of the limited transactional duties owed in a nondiscretionary account,
as opposed to the broader and continuing relational duties owed in a discretionary account, the
court in Leib states:
Between the purely non-discretionary account and the purely discretionary account there
is a hybrid-type account which plaintiff claims existed in this case. Such an account is one
in which the broker has usurped actual control over a technically nondiscretionary ac-
count. In such cases the courts have held that the broker owes his customer the same
fiduciary duties as he would have had the account been discretionary from the moment of
its creation.
Id. at 954.
Phrased in this fashion, the de facto control issue gives appropriate weight to the legal control
that the customer's choice of account suggests. This approach properly requires the customer to
prove that he relinquished, and the broker assumed, control over the account. Giving initial weight
to the form of the account assures that the burden of proof on the issue of control rests with the
plaintiff in practice as well as in theory. A plaintiff would still be free to argue in appropriate
circumstances that his choice of account was uninformed and thus entitled to no weight.
See M & B Contracting Corp. v. Dale, 601 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 795
F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that broker did not usurp control from customer and citing Leib
with approval); Williamsport Firemen Pension Bds. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 567 F. Supp. 140, 144-45
(M.D. Pa. 1983) (dismissing complaint where plaintiffs failed to plead or otherwise establish that
they relinquished control of accounts to defendants and citing Leib with approval); Lehman v.
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ker's role, phrasing the issue in the former fashion often results in decisions
that seem to approach the issue of control as if the broker must negate it.272
Courts also tend to confuse the issue of who controlled the account with
the issue of whether the customer's recovery is barred by an affirmative de-
fense based on failure to act in the face of regular receipt of account informa-
tion.2 73 The decisions often treat the issues in tandem as if they were
synonymous. 274 Thus, a finding that the broker exercised de facto control
almost invariably results in summary rejection of any affirmative defenses
based on the customer's receipt of account information. 275 In fact, these two
issues are not identical. For example, when a churning claim involves a dis-
cretionary account, the broker necessarily concedes his control. Neverthe-
less, a broker may still be able to establish an affirmative defense based upon
a customer's knowing acquiescence to the volume and frequency of trading
in the face of regular receipt of confirmation slips and account statements.2 76
Similarly, proof that a broker exercised de facto control over a nondiscre-
Madda Trading Co., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,417, at 29,866
(CFTC Nov. 13, 1984) (customer retains legal right to control trading in nondiscretionary account;
factfinder must determine whether customer retained actual, as well as legal, control over trading or
effectively surrendered de facto control to broker).
272. In contrast, it is interesting to note that in each of the securities opinions discussed supra
note 271 in which the court phrased its inquiry in terms of whether the broker usurped control from
the customer, the customer failed with respect to the control issue. Each of these decisions, how-
ever, also involved a plaintiff whose background and activity with respect to the account apparently
placed him in the category of sophisticated customers.
273. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (discussing affirmative defenses raised in
churning actions).
274. See, e.g., Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049-51 (7th Cir. 1974) (failing to give
defendant broker's requested instruction on waiver and estoppel not prejudicial error under circum-
stances of case; estoppel and waiver so merged with issue of control that separate treatment redun-
dant, if not confusing); Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 211 (D.
Mass. 1978) (treating in tandem control and affirmative defenses of ratification, waiver, and estop-
pel; finding broker in control and rejecting affirmative defenses); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,
283 F. Supp. 417, 433-35 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (discussing control and affirmative defense of estoppel in
tandem; finding broker in control and rejecting estoppel on churning claim), modified in part and
aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970) (discussing estoppel only).
275. See, eg., Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 211 (D. Mass.
1978) (rejecting ratification, waiver, and estoppel); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp.
417, 433-35 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (rejecting ratification, waiver, and estoppel), modified in part and
aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970); Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal.
App. 2d 690, 729, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 248-49 (1968) (rejecting ratification and laches).
Conversely, a finding that a customer controlled his account is frequently buttressed by tandem
reference to principles of waiver, estoppel, or ratification that also bar recovery. See Altschul v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 591, 594-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (couple whose
son is broker's employee held in control of account and also barred from relief by ratification);
Powers v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 432-33 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (customer found in
control of account and also barred from relief because his knowledge and experience gave him
notice that his account was not being managed in accordance with his alleged instructions).
276. See Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 393, 400-01 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (when plaintiff alleges churning of discretionary account by broker who had traded it accord-
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tionary account should not necessarily preclude the possibility of a valid af-
firmative defense based on a customer's failure to object. Obviously,
evidence relating to control of trading by the broker may be highly relevant
to assessment of the customer's duty to complain. For instance, a finding
that the customer lacked the necessary sophistication to be found in control
of the pattern of trading in his account may in some circumstances also sup-
port a conclusion that he lacked the requisite intelligence and understanding
to detect excessive trading from account information for purposes of register-
ing a complaint. 277 This result, however, does not follow automatically. The
two issues are different, and resolution of the latter requires an independent
evaluation of the particular circumstances of the plaintiff, the nature and
clarity of the account information furnished by the broker, and the complex-
ity of the trading involved.278
ing to technical system for 17 years, court rejects any finding of excessive trading, invoking princi-
ples of estoppel), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977).
An interesting twist in the context of a discretionary account is found in Smith v. Sade & Co.,
[1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,846 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 1982), which illustrates
the tendency of courts to confuse and coalesce the issues of control over the account and affirmative
defenses. In Smith the trial court held that the defendant broker did not control discretionary
accounts opened and actively monitored by highly sophisticated plaintiffs, a former U.S. ambassa-
dor and the ambassador's wife. Id. at 94,364. While the facts of the case clearly justify the court's
rejection of any liability for churning, the court's analysis is questionable. Because the accounts
were discretionary, the decision might have been better framed in terms of application of affirmative
defenses such as waiver, estoppel, or ratification.
277. See Gatens v. International Precious Metals Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCII) % 22,636, at 30,709-10 (CFTC June 18, 1985) (blue collar worker/flower shop
operator with no prior commodities knowledge unable to detect pattern of overtrading from notices
of entry into trades); Piskur v. International Precious Metals Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) % 22,493, at 30,189 (CFTC Jan. 2, 1985) (advice that particular trades
have been entered does not put blast furnace laborer and cleaning woman with no commodities
experience on notice that account being overtraded); Lehman v. Madda Trading Co., [1984-1986
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) V 22,417, at 29,869 (CFTC Nov. 13, 1984) (relatively
unsophisticated customers cannot recognize pattern of overtrading from confirmation slips).
278. Thus, for example, the CFTC has generally found the defenses of ratification and estoppel
to be of limited practical use in reparations proceedings for churning of commodity futures con-
tracts or leverage transactions. Noting that churning is an ongoing, continuous offense that is diffi-
cult to detect, the Commission has held the defenses of ratification and estoppel unavailing unless
the evidence demonstrates that the customer possessed sufficient sophistication and experience to
enable him to discover that his account was being overtraded. The Commission usually cites the
same evidence used to support a finding of de facto control by the broker to reject applicability of
such affirmative defenses.
The Commission's analysis is no doubt correct, and its application of these principles to the cases
with which it has dealt is also justified. In Piskur, for example, the customer was a 69-year-old
retiree with no prior trading experience. He had held a variety of blue-collar jobs for most of his
life, and his formal education was limited to grade school. The defendant brokerage firm failed to
provide regular statements that would have permitted the customer to understand the status of his
accounts. The customer's expert witness testified that even he had difficulty determining the status
of the account at any given time from the information provided. Id. at 30,189. On this record the
Commission had no difficulty rejecting the defenses of ratification and estoppel.
This should not mean, however, that such defenses may not succeed if asserted against a plaintiff
1930
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The courts' tendency to treat the control issue and affirmative defenses iln a
lump sum fashion may contribute to the predilection in favor of the plaintiff
discussed earlier.279 The customer carries the burden of proof with respect to
control; the broker bears the burden of proof with respect to affirmative de-
fenses. 280 However, because courts often treat the two issues together, the
tone of their opinions often suggests that the broker is required to negate a
finding of control. 28'
Finally, although the decisions purport to treat the control element as a
discrete part of the plaintiff's claim, the results suggest that the finder of fact
may be influenced by other parts of the case in determining control-particu-
larly in the difficult mixed control situations. 282 Because the existing stan-
dards on de facto control force an all-or-nothing decision, when the case
presents a close question of control, such factors as the amount of trading,
the size of the customer's losses, and the presence or absence of other broker
misconduct may tip the scales on the control issue.283
V. A SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK FOR DE FAcTo CONTROL: RETURN TO
AN EMPHASIS ON RELIANCE
As discussed earlier, the relational nature of a churning claim is somewhat
different in focus than the transactional orientation of the ordinary securities
or commodities fraud suit.284 In the typical suit under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5, for example, the plaintiff generally complains about some inadequacy
in disclosure that influenced his decision to purchase or sell a particular se-
curity. The plaintiff usually must prove (1) that the defendant made a mate-
who is not totally unsophisticated and who receives regular account information in a clear and
comprehensible format about less complex types of trading.
279. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
280. See 5C A. JACOBS, supra note 60, § 295, at 12-56 (plaintiff bears burden of proving elements
of his cause of action; defendant bears burden of proving any affirmative defense).
281. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text (discussing antecedents of this tendency in
early SEC enforcement decisions).
283. Compare, for example, the success of the customers on the control issue in Mihara v. Dean
Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1980), discussed supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text,
and Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified in part and aff'd
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970), discussed supra notes 131-50 and accompanying text, with the failure
of the customer to establish de facto control in Marshak v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 413 F.
Supp. 377 (N.D. Okla. 1975) (plaintiff's prior trading experience, membership in stock club, occa-
sional subscription to Wall Street Journal, and visits to broker's office sufficient to establish control).
All three cases involved customers whose educational background, occupational history, prior
trading experience, and/or activity in monitoring their accounts arguably removed them from the
spectrum of churning cases involving financially unsophisticated investors. The customers in Hecht
and Mihara, however, prevailed on the control issue in the presence of evidence of high turnover
ratios, large commissions, and, in Hecht, active broker misconduct. The customer in Marshak
failed where the turnover ratio and the ratio of commissions to net equity were low.
284. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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rial misrepresentation or omission of fact, (2) in connection with the
plaintiff's purchase or sale of a security, (3) that the plaintiff relied on this
information in making his investment decision, (4) that the defendant acted
with scienter, and (5) that as a result, the plaintiff has been damaged. 285
Plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's disclosure provides part of the neces-
sary causal connection between the wrongdoing of which he complains, i.e.,
the misrepresentation or omission, and his right to recover. 286 Plaintiff ex-
pected that the disclosure furnished by the defendant was accurate. If that
information affected the plaintiff's decision and was inaccurate, plaintiff's
expectation has been disappointed. Assuming the defendant acted with the
requisite state of mind, the plaintiff is entitled to damages flowing from injury
to this informational reliance interest.28 7
By contrast, the gist of the wrong in a churning suit is not inadequate
disclosure and deception in the context of a particular transaction, but the
broker's abuse of his fiduciary relationship with his customer by putting his
own self-interest ahead of his customer's. 288 The plaintiff must prove (1) that
the broker excessively traded an account (2) over which he exercised control
(3) in order to generate commissions for himself to the detriment of the
plaintiff, and (4) that the broker possessed the requisite state of mind.
285. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing elements of typical securities fraud
action).
286. Admittedly, this is a simplistic description of the function of one of the most complex por-
tions of a plaintiff's prima facie case under rule lob-5 in situations involving inadequate disclosure;
it will suffice, however, for purposes of comparing the control portion of a churning claim.
Causation in a transactional fraud case under rule lab-5 can be viewed as having three different
facets. The rule's requirement that the fraud be "in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security" dictates that there be some relationship between the alleged deception and the purchase or
sale in question. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13
(1971) (interpreting this language broadly during era of expansive judicial construction of rule lOb-
5 to require only that alleged fraud "touch" purchase or sale). The reliance requirement focuses on
whether the alleged misrepresentation or omission induced the plaintiff to purchase or sell. This is
sometimes referred to as transaction causation and may be analogized to common law tort princi-
ples of "but for" causation or "causation in fact." Additionally, some courts require that the plain-
tiff establish that his actual monetary injury was directly attributable to the inadequate disclosure.
This is sometimes referred to as loss causation and may be analogized to the common law tort
concept of proximate cause.
For an excellent overview of the multi-faceted causation requirements in a rule lOb-5 action, see
In re Catanella & E.F. Hutton & Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1414-17 (E.D. Pa. 1984). See
generally 5A A. JAcoBs, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 §§ 64.01-.02 (1985); T.
HAZEN, supra note 29, §§ 13.5-.6.
Additionally, while this discussion speaks of misrepresentations and omissions collectively with
respect to the reliance requirement in a transactional fraud case under rule lOb-5, the reliance
requirement has been relaxed in cases involving omissions by granting a presumption in favor of
reliance upon proof of materiality and duty to disclose. Moreover, some courts have also relaxed the
reliance requirement by allowing a plaintiff to establish reliance on the integrity of the market, as
opposed to reliance on the disputed information. See supra note 17, at (5).
287. See Langevoort, supra note 18, at 1251-52.
288. See supra notes 14, 15, 18 and accompanying text.
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A high volume of trading directed by the customer is not wrongful. It is
the broker's control over the account that supplies the necessary causal con-
nection between the alleged wrongdoing-the excessive trading-and the
plaintiff's right to recover. 289 In delegating control over investment deci-
sions to the broker, the customer expects that the broker will act in the cus-
tomer's best interests. If instead the broker acts in his own self-interest, the
customer's expectation has been disappointed, his relational reliance interest
has been damaged, and he has been deceived. Such a situation is analogous
to the informational reliance interest injured in the more typical transac-
tional fraud setting.290 Thus, the control portion of a churning claim is the
functional equivalent of the reliance element in a more typical transactional
fraud suit.
The early SEC enforcement cases focus on the relational reliance interest
at stake in a churning claim. Many of the subsequent judicial decisions that
devise tests for de facto control can be viewed as painfully struggling to artic-
ulate this reliance interest. These later decisions, however, seem to lose
touch with the underlying question of reliance in the process of rephrasing
the question as one of control over the account and attempting specific artic-
ulations of what constitutes control.
Whether phrased in terms of the Hecht standard of invariably following
289. See Langevoort, supra note 18, at 1281.
290. Professor Langevoort comes to this conclusion in his excellent comparative discussion of
the law of breach of fiduciary duty and fraud under common law. See Langevoort, supra note 18.
As Professor Langevoort notes after differentiating between breaches of fiduciary duty and fraud:
[The more significant point is how conceptually similar the two doctrines really are. An
antifraud prohibition encourages reliance on others by preventing one person from taking
undue advantage of another's lack of information, generally in the contract formation
process (ex ante). Fiduciary responsibility law furthers precisely the same objective by
extending the protection against cheating expost and by recognizing that in any relational
contract setting similar opportunities to take advantage of the other party's reliance con-
tinue throughout the relationship. Thus, both doctrines serve to proscribe the appropria-
tion of value arising out of an exchange relationship to which one party would not consent
and could avoid if fully informed.
Id. at 1252.
Moving on to address the overlap between the law of fiduciary duty and fraud in those breaches
of fiduciary duty labeled constructive fraud, Professor Langevoort concludes:
Despite a tendency to link active fraud with active principal decisions and constructive
fraud with passivity, deception is present to some extent in all the examples set forth
above. The principal is misinformed, to his detriment. In such cases, not to decide is to
decide; even the passive principal is at least implicitly faced with the decision of whether
to continue to grant, or instead to preempt, the fiduciary's discretion-a decision that in
theory should be adequately informed. In other words, the two doctrines [active fraud
and constructive fraud] are conceptually inseparable. Protecting a relational reliance
serves much the same transaction-encouraging objective as does the bargain-oriented duty
of full disclosure.
Id. at 1257 (footnotes omitted).
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the recommendations of the broker, 291 the Carras standard of whether the
customer has sufficient financial acumen to determine his own best inter-
est, 292 the Follansbee standard of whether the customer has the ability to
evaluate suggestions and refuse to trade,293 or the Tiernan and CFTC multi-
ple criteria approaches that examine the customer's sophistication, prior
trading experience, and activity in connection with the account, 294 the ulti-
mate question in the control portion of a churning claim is whether the cus-
tomer relied on the broker. Reliance on the broker supplies the necessary
causal link between the alleged wrongdoing in this relational setting and the
plaintiff's right to recover for that wrongdoing, just as reliance on faulty or
inadequate disclosure is required for recovery in a transactional fraud case.
Reorienting the control portion of a churning suit to a more explicit focus
on the relational reliance concerns that dominate the early SEC opinions
would substitute a conceptual framework with which courts are more famil-
iar in fraud cases. Courts are used to treating reliance in a transactional
fraud suit as part of plaintiff's prima facie case, as to which plaintiff bears the
burden of proof. Furthermore, a reliance framework may provide more
workable solutions in the difficult mixed control situations. In the transac-
tional fraud area, courts are accustomed to dealing with claims of multiple
misrepresentations and omissions. A plaintiff may be able to establish some
but not all of the claimed inadequacies in disclosure and his reliance on these
inadequacies. In such a case, the plaintiff is entitled to recover those dam-
ages that flow from the misrepresentations or omissions on which he relied.
In contrast, courts have traditionally characterized churning as a unified of-
fense, for which a trade-by-trade analysis is inappropriate. 295 This approach
is no doubt appropriate in polar cases of control by the broker where the
plaintiff's reliance is virtually absolute. If reliance is recognized as the un-
derlying inquiry and causal link, however, then in mixed control cases those
trades that can be clearly segregated as initiated by the customer or made
291. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified in part and
aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (broker controls if customer invariably follows advice).
292. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975) (customer controls if he has financial acumen
to determine financial best interest).
293. Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1982) (customer controls if he
has capacity to say "yes" or "no" to broker's advice).
294. Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983) (multiple factors as-
sessed to determine control); Smith v. Siegel Trading Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) % 21,105 (CFTC Sept. 3, 1980) (CFTC multiple factor approach to issue of de facto
control).
295. See Shad v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 799 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1986) (churning is
unified offense identified only by analysis of entire history of broker's management of account);
Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 327 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (stating that churning
is unified offense, but rejecting argument that necessary corollary is that damage award may not
include trading losses because they are impossible to compute exactly).
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with the customer's informed consent should be excluded from the computa-
tion of damages.
The Seventh Circuit came to this conclusion in Fey v. Walston & Co. 296
The court remanded a difficult mixed control case for a new trial in part
because the original damage award, calculated under the out-of-pocket the-
ory, included compensation for several trades that the plaintiff had clearly
directed. 297 In light of evidence that plaintiff had independently initiated
some transactions, the court questioned the propriety of a control instruction
patterned after Hecht.298 Correlating this evidence with its review of the
damage award, the court noted:
Plaintiff would have the damage instruction sustained on the basic premise
that churning is a unified offense to be established and recompensed not on
evidence of individual transactions but by the extended course of opera-
tions ....
In an uncomplicated churning case, where a general discretionary power
is abused merely to generate commissions, or where through breach of fidu-
ciary duty a broker induces a trusting customer to generally overtrade, we
think the plaintiff's position may be the sounder one .... The difficulty
here, already adverted to in another connection, is that uncontradicted tes-
timony from plaintiff herself indicated that certain transactions which pa-
tently were considered in the jury verdict.., were independently instigated
by the plaintiff. As it is, there can be no assurance that the jury did not
determine that as to some of the most sizable transactions entering into the
296. 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974).
297. Id. at 1054-55. One might argue whether Mrs. Hecht in Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,
283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified in part and aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970),
presented a case involving a naive and dependent widow, as the trial court found, or a more difficult
mixed control situation. There seems little question, however, that Mrs. Fey presented a mixed
control case.
Mrs. Fey, a widow, had been employed since her husband's death in 1956, having inherited little
or no assets. At the time she opened her account with defendants, she had approximately $12,000
in assets that she had accumulated in part through some investments. 493 F.2d at 1042. Plaintiff's
complaint alleged that she reposed complete trust and confidence in the defendants. She also admit-
ted at trial, however, that either she or her son-to whom she had given a general power of attorney
to trade her account for a disputed period of time-initiated a number of transactions not recom-
mended to her by the defendants. The evidence also established that she engaged in trading
through at least one other brokerage house while her account was open with defendants. Id. at
1043.
The appellate court stated that the general effect of plaintiff's testimony was to represent herself
as a customer with some fixed ideas of her own, relying somewhat on her son and occasionally on
other brokers, but otherwise generally relying on the defendants. Id. at 1044.
Defendants denied having control over plaintiff's account. In remanding for a new trial, the
appellate court noted that the trial court improperly restricted defendants from exploring plaintiff's
earlier trading experience, her investment objectives, and a line of inquiry designed to show that
plaintiff's son wanted to trade her account to cover his gambling losses. Id. at 1045.
298. Id. at 1048-49.
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computation of damages the defendant had no part, either by way of initia-
tion, inducement or encouragement.
It is now elementary that when precise damage measurements are pre-
cluded by wrongful acts, the wrongdoer cannot insist upon exact measure-
ments and the precise tracing of causal lines to an impractical extent; fair
approximations are in order. But the unified nature of the typical churning
offense does not render the element of causation immaterial. Granting that
transaction by transaction appraisals in churning cases often will be incon-
sistent with the unified nature of the offense, or impractical and sometimes
unfair... the facts here are exceptional. Where, as here, there is strong
indication that certain substantial damage components arose independent
of the acts or conduct of the defendants, they may not be lumped in for the
jury's consideration without at least affording some guide by which they
can be eliminated from consideration upon a determination that, indeed,
the defendants had nothing to do with them.299
The opinion in Fey better captures the reliance interest at stake in the control
portion of a churning claim and its key role as a causal link in establishing
plaintiff's right to recover. Focusing on reliance in this fashion might well
produce fairer and more consistent results in churning cases than have to
date been achieved.
If the control question is recognized as one in which the underlying in-
quiry is reliance and causation, courts can continue to treat polar cases of
control in an all-or-nothing fashion. When control is present in such circum-
stances, it is appropriate to compute damages in the aggregate based on the
entire course of trading.30° At the same time, a focus on reliance may better
accommodate the more difficult mixed control cases in which the customer is
neither a totally unsophisticated passive investor nor a savvy market player
independently making his own trading decisions or actively monitoring his
account. In such cases, a focus on reliance will provide a familiar concept
with which to determine whether the customer should recover at all. Where
that determination is made favorably to the plaintiff, reliance may furnish a
helpful analytical framework for fashioning a finely tuned recovery that ex-
cludes those trades directed by the customer or made with his informed
consent.
299. Id. at 1054-55 (citation omitted).
300. See id. at 1054-55 (churning damages measured over entire course of trading when broker
abused general discretionary authority to generate commissions or induced a trusting customer to
generally overtrade).
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